@inproceedings{SymbolicSignaturesCCS19,
 author = {Jackson, Dennis and Cremers, Cas and Cohn-Gordon, Katriel and Sasse, Ralf},
 title = {Seems Legit: Automated Analysis of Subtle Attacks on Protocols That Use Signatures},
 booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
 series = {CCS '19},
 year = {2019},
 isbn = {978-1-4503-6747-9},
 location = {London, United Kingdom},
 pages = {2165--2180},
 numpages = {16},
 url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3319535.3339813},
 doi = {10.1145/3319535.3339813},
 acmid = {3339813},
 publisher = {ACM},
 address = {New York, NY, USA},
 keywords = {automated analysis, digital signatures, formal verification, proverif, security protocols, symbolic model, tamarin prover},
}