@InProceedings{	  basin.ea:degrees:2010,
  abstract	= {We present a symbolic framework, based on a modular
		  operational semantics, for formalizing different notions of
		  compromise relevant for the analysis of cryptographic
		  protocols. The framework's rules can be combined in 
		  different ways to specify different adversary capabilities,
		  capturing different practically-relevant notions of key and
		  state compromise. We have extended an existing
		  security-protocol analysis tool, Scyther, with our
		  adversary models. This is the first tool that systematically
		  supports notions such as weak perfect forward secrecy, key
		  compromise impersonation, and adversaries capable of
		  state-reveal queries. We also introduce the concept of a
		  protocol-security hierarchy, which classifies the relative
		  strength of protocols against different forms of compromise.
		  In case studies, we use Scyther to automatically construct
		  protocol-security hierarchies that refine and correct
		  relationships between protocols previously reported in the
		  cryptographic literature.},
  address	= {Brno, Czech Republic},
  author	= {David Basin and Cas Cremers},
  booktitle	= {19th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic
		  (CSL)},
  copyright	= {Springer-Verlag},
  editor	= {Anuj Dawar and Helmut Veith},
  month		= 08,
  pages		= {1--18},
  pdf		= {papers/2010/compromise-CSL2010.pdf},
  publisher	= {Springer-Verlag},
  series	= {LNCS},
  title		= {Degrees of Security: Protocol Guarantees in the Face of
		  Compromising Adversaries},
  volume	= 6247,
  year		= 2010
}