01 — Game theory and economics
Non-Nashian game theory
How does predictability change the way we model rational decisions? I co-designed equilibrium concepts for games in which agents’ choices and their predictions are interdependent, and study their implications for cooperation.
Paper on perfect predictionThe research in depth
Generalization of superrationality to non-symmetric games
Generalization of superrationality to dynamic games (solving Grandfather's paradoxes)
We live in a world where AI/ML technology is getting better every day at predicting the action of human beings, leading to increasingly interdependent decisions. Yet, the discipline that is dedicated to the modelling of what rational agents should or would do, game theory, is commonly based on a strong assumption of free choice in which agents are by essence unpredictable: in the Nash paradigm, economic agents optimize their decisions by freezing what everybody else does and unilaterally considering their possible decisions. This motivates investigating decision models with different assumptions about predictability.
I am investigating what happens if, instead, we assume that rational agents are perfectly predictable, an idea that Prof. J.-P. Dupuy (Stanford) coined in the 1990s. Free choice can be reconciled with predictability with a fixpoint framework in which a decision is entangled with its always correct prediction, and this decision must be immune to its prediction in terms of causality. In other words, the correct prediction of a decision must trigger a chain of events that causes this very decision to be taken (self-fulfilling prophecy). This kind of thinking is similar to what the Director of a central bank tries to avoid on a macroscopic level: saying too boldly that the economy is doing well may lead to a market crash, contradicting their prediction, since interest rate hikes would then be expected by the public.
I co-designed the corresponding non-Nashian equilibrium concepts and algorithms for games in both extensive and normal form. As predicted in a conjecture by Prof. Dupuy, notably, Pareto optimal outcomes are always reached. Concretely, this means that, unlike in the Nash paradigm, it is rational to be honest and not betray other agents. Philosophically, the underlying concept is that of a Kantian categorical imperative urging to avoid Grandfather's paradoxes.
Future directions of research include investigating the feasibility of programming robots and artificial intelligences with non-Nashian algorithms, to investigate their implications for cooperation in AI systems.
