


Distributed goodness-of-fit: when you can't talk much and have little in common

Jayadev Acharya (Cornell), [Clément Canonne](#) (Stanford), Yanjun Han (Stanford), Ziteng Sun (Cornell), and Himanshu Tyagi (IISc Bangalore)

Insert motivating story
here.

~~(something about beats?)~~



Perform statistical inference
in this distributed setting

Goal



Perform statistical inference
in this distributed setting

Goal

SMP

identity testing (goodness-of-fit)

Perform ~~statistical inference~~
in this distributed setting


SMP

Goal




Identity testing

Known distribution q on $[R] = \{1, 2, \dots, R\}$



Distance parameter ε



$$H_0: p = q$$

vs.




$$H_1: TV(p, q) > \varepsilon$$


What's known

- Centralized: $\Theta\left(\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\epsilon^2}\right)$ [Pam'08, VV'17]
- Our setting: $\Theta\left(\frac{k}{2^{\ell/2} \epsilon^2}\right)$ public-coin [ACT'19_{1,2}]
- $\Theta\left(\frac{k^{3/2}}{2^{\ell} \epsilon^2}\right)$ private-coin [ACT'19_{1,2}]

ℓ : # bits each player can send

Oh yes, about that...

Public-coin:  and all  's share common random seed
(Hardcoded or broadcast to all by )

Private-coin: every  for itself (indep^t randomness)

(disables both settings here)

Moreover, the optimal public-coin
protocol only requires $O(\log k)$ shared
random bits.

Yay.

However...

What happens when we have only *few*
shared random bits? Say, $\sqrt{\log k}$,
or 15?

Let's say s .

Theorem. For any $l \geq 1$, $s \geq 0$ s.t. $l+s \leq \log k$,
there is a protocol for identity testing w/

$$\frac{\sqrt{k}}{\epsilon^2} \quad \sqrt{\frac{k}{2^l}} \quad \sqrt{\frac{k}{2^{s+l}}}$$

phones. Moreover, this is tight.

~~Proof~~. Ideas.

Lower bound

Generalize the *private-coin* \max min and *public-coin* \min max decoupled χ^2 -fluctuations notions from [ACT'19] to limited randomness: semimaxmin

$$\underline{\chi}(\mathcal{W}, \epsilon, s) = \sup_{\substack{\mathcal{W}_s \subseteq \mathcal{W}^n \\ |\mathcal{W}_s| \leq 2^s}} \inf_{P \in \mathcal{T}_\epsilon} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{W}^n} [\chi^{(2)}(\mathcal{W}^n | P)]$$

Upper bound

"Derandomization" of key anticoncentration lemma in [ACT'19]

Theorem. $\forall n, \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $\exists m \lesssim n$ subsets $S_1, \dots, S_m \subseteq [n]$ w/ $|S_j| = \frac{n}{2}$
s.t.

$$\mathbb{P}_{j \sim [m]} \left\{ \left| \sum_{i \in S_j} x_i \right|^2 \gtrsim \|x\|_2^2 \right\} \gtrsim 1$$

Apply this with $n := 2^s$ to reduce the problem to private-coin identity testing over a domain of size $L \asymp \frac{k}{2^s}$, w/ distance $\varepsilon' \asymp \frac{\varepsilon}{\sqrt{2^s}}$.

Using the protocol from [ACT'19]:

$$\frac{L^{3/2}}{2^l \varepsilon'^2} \asymp \frac{k^{3/2}}{2^l \sqrt{2^s} \varepsilon^2} = \frac{\sqrt{k}}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{k}{2^l}} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{k}{2^{s+l}}}$$

phases suffice, as claimed*.

*OK, with a catch.

This gives a tester w/ low soundness (big Type-II error).
And we **cannot** amplify by repetition: our **s** bits are gone!

*OK, with a catch.

This gives a tester w/ low soundness (big Type-II error).
And we **cannot** amplify by repetition: our **s** bits are gone!

Solution: boost using the same randomness (but 100x more phones)!

Details omitted. See board.

Open questions

More uses of this "derandomization" lemma?

Of this probability amplification technique?

Extend to other local constraints?

Is my handwriting **that** terrible?

Thank you.