U-TRR

Uncovering in-DRAM RowHammer Protection Mechanisms: A New Methodology, Custom RowHammer Patterns, and Implications

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Summary

DRAM **RowHammer** vulnerability leads to critical reliability and security issues

Target Row Refresh (TRR):
a set of obscure, undocumented, and proprietary RowHammer mitigation techniques

Is TRR fully secure? How can we validate its security guarantees?

U-TRR	A new methodology that leverages *data retention failures* to uncover the inner workings of TRR and study its security
High-Level Operation	1) Profile the retention time of a row R 2) Find when TRR refreshes R to understand the underlying TRR mechanism



All 45 modules we test are **vulnerable**

99.9% of rows in a DRAM bank experience **at least one RowHammer bit flip**

Up to **7** RowHammer **bit flips** in an 8-byte dataword, **making ECC ineffective**

U-TRR can enable **more secure** RowHammer solutions

Outline

1. DRAM Operation Basics
2. RowHammer & Target Row Refresh
3. The U-TRR Methodology
4. Observations & New RowHammer Access Patterns
5. RowHammer Bit Flip Analysis
6. Takeaways and Conclusion

DRAM Organization

Memory Bus

Memory Controller

CPU

Accessing DRAM



DRAM Cell Leakage

Each cell encodes information in **leaky** capacitors



Stored data is **corrupted** if too much charge leaks (i.e., the capacitor voltage degrades too much)

[Patel+, ISCA'17]

DRAM Refresh



Periodic **refresh operations** preserve stored data

[Patel+, ISCA'17]

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The RowHammer Vulnerability



Repeatedly **opening** (activating) and **closing** (precharging) a DRAM row causes **RowHammer bit flips** in nearby cells

Target Row Refresh (TRR)

DRAM vendors equip their DRAM chips with a *proprietary* mitigation mechanisms known as **Target Row Refresh (TRR)**

Key Idea: TRR refreshes nearby rows upon detecting an aggressor row



The Problem with TRR

TRR is obscure, undocumented, and proprietary

We cannot easily study the *security properties* of TRR

Goal

Study in-DRAM TRR mechanisms to

1. **understand** how they operate

2. **assess** their security

3. **secure** DRAM completely against RowHammer

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Overview of U-TRR

U-TRR: A new methodology to *uncover* the inner workings of TRR

Key idea: Use data retention failures as a side channel to detect when a row is refreshed by TRR

High-Level U-TRR Operation

U-TRR has two main components:
Row Scout (RS) and **TRR Analyzer (TRR-A)**

Row Scout: finds a **set of DRAM rows** that meet certain requirements as needed by TRR-A and **identifies the data retention times** of these rows

TRR Analyzer: uses RS-provided rows to **distinguish between TRR-induced and regular refreshes**, and thus builds an understanding of the underlying TRR mechanism



Row Scout (RS)

Goal: Identify a list of *useful* DRAM rows and their *retention times*

Row Scout **must** find:

- ✓ Rows with **consistent*** retention times
  - ➢ To correctly infer whether a row has been refreshed
- ✓ **Multiple rows** that are located at *certain configurable distances* and have the *same retention time (i.e., Row Group)*
  - ➢ To observe whether TRR can refresh multiple rows at the same time



** The retention time of a DRAM row may change over time due to Variable Retention Time (VRT) effects*

Row Scout (RS) Operation



Row Group: V □ V □ V

TRR Analyzer (TRR-A)

Goal: Use RS-provided rows to determine when TRR refreshes a victim row

High-level Operation:

1) Run a certain DRAM access pattern (i.e., RowHammer attack)
2) Monitor retention failures in RS-provided rows to determine when TRR refreshes any of these rows
3) Develop an understanding of the underlying TRR operation



TRR Analyzer (TRR-A) Operation



Row Group: V A V A V

V: victim (RS-provided) rows
A: aggressor rows
D: dummy rows

Experiment Configuration

- *aggressor (A) row addr.*
- *dummy (D) row count*
- *hammering mode*
- *number of rounds*
- *A/D hammer counts*
- *REF count*

TRR-A helps to understand how TRR operates based on when Retention Profiled Rows are refreshed by TRR

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DRAM Testing Infrastructure

We implement U-TRR using FPGA-based *SoftMC* [Hassan+, HPCA'17] *modified to support DDR4 DRAM*

Module	Date (yy-ww)	Chip Density (Gbit)	Organization			HC_{first}†	Our Key TRR Observations and Results							
			Ranks	Banks	Pins		Version	Aggressor Detection	Aggressor Capacity	Per-Bank TRR	TRR-to-REF Ratio	Neighbors Refreshed	% Vulnerable DRAM Rows†	Max. Bit Flips per Row per Hammer†
A0	19-50	8	1	16	8	16K	A_{TRR1}	Counter-based	16	✓	1/9	4	73.3%	1.16
A1-5	19-36	8	1	8	16	13K-15K	A_{TRR1}	Counter-based	16	✓	1/9	4	99.2% - 99.4%	2.32 - 4.73
A6-7	19-45	8	1	8	16	13K-15K	A_{TRR1}	Counter-based	16	✓	1/9	4	99.3% - 99.4%	2.12 - 3.86
A8-9	20-07	8	1	16	8	12K-14K	A_{TRR1}	Counter-based	16	✓	1/9	4	74.6% - 75.0%	1.96 - 2.96
A10-12	19-51	8	1	16	8	12K-13K	A_{TRR1}	Counter-based	16	✓	1/9	4	74.6% - 75.0%	1.48 - 2.86
A13-14	20-31	8	1	8	16	11K-14K	A_{TRR2}	Counter-based	16	✓	1/9	2	94.3% - 98.6%	1.53 - 2.78
B0	18-22	4	1	16	8	44K	B_{TRR1}	Sampling-based	1	✗	1/4	2	99.9%	2.13
B1-4	20-17	4	1	16	8	159K-192K	B_{TRR1}	Sampling-based	1	✗	1/4	2	23.3% - 51.2%	0.06 - 0.11
B5-6	16-48	4	1	16	8	44K-50K	B_{TRR1}	Sampling-based	1	✗	1/4	2	99.9%	1.85 - 2.03
B7	19-06	8	2	16	8	20K	B_{TRR1}	Sampling-based	1	✗	1/4	2	99.9%	31.14
B8	18-03	4	1	16	8	43K	B_{TRR1}	Sampling-based	1	✗	1/4	2	99.9%	2.57
B9-12	19-48	8	1	16	8	42K-65K	B_{TRR2}	Sampling-based	1	✗	1/9	2	36.3% - 38.9%	16.83 - 24.26
B13-14	20-08	4	1	16	8	11K-14K	B_{TRR3}	Sampling-based	1	✓	1/2	4	99.9%	16.20 - 18.12
C0-3	16-48	4	1	16	x8	137K-194K	C_{TRR1}	Mix	Unknown	✓	1/17	2	1.0% - 23.2%	0.05 - 0.15
C4-6	17-12	8	1	16	x8	130K-150K	C_{TRR1}	Mix	Unknown	✓	1/17	2	7.8% - 12.0%	0.06 - 0.08
C7-8	20-31	8	1	8	x16	40K-44K	C_{TRR1}	Mix	Unknown	✓	1/17	2	39.8% - 41.8%	9.66 - 14.56
C9-11	20-31	8	1	8	x16	42K-53K	C_{TRR2}	Mix	Unknown	✓	1/9	2	99.7%	9.30 - 32.04
C12-14	20-46	16	1	8	x16	6K-7K	C_{TRR3}	Mix	Unknown	✓	1/8	2	99.9%	4.91 - 12.64

Table 1 in our paper provides more information about the analyzed modules

15x Vendor C DDR4 modules

Key Observations: Vendor A

Refresh Types:
- Regular Refresh (RR)
- TRR-capable Refresh ($TREF_1$ and $TREF_2$)



Observation: TRR tracks potentially aggressor rows using a Counter Table

$TREF_1$: Refreshes the victims of **row ID** with the **largest counter value**

$TREF_2$: Refreshes the victims of **row ID** that $TREF_2$ pointer refers to



Circumventing Vendor A's TRR

Approach: Ensure an aggressor row is **discarded** from the *Counter Table* **prior** to a REF command





A_i: aggressor row
D_i: dummy row

[A1, A2] **not** refreshed by TRR

This RowHammer access pattern requires **synchronizing** accesses with REF commands

Circumventing Vendor A's TRR by discarding the actual aggressor rows from the Counter Table

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Key Observations: Vendor B

Refresh Types:

- Regular Refresh (RR)
- TRR-capable Refresh (**TREF**)



Observation 1: TRR *probabilistically* samples the address of an activated row

Observation 2: A newly-sampled row overwrites the previously-sampled one

TREF: Refreshes the victims of the **last sampled row**

Circumventing Vendor B's TRR

Approach: Maximize the **dummy** row hammers **after** hammering the **aggressor** rows and **before** the next **TREF**



Circumventing Vendor B's TRR by making it replace a sampled aggressor row by sampling **a dummy row**

Key Observations: Vendor C

Refresh Types:
- Regular Refresh (RR)
- TRR-capable Refresh (**TREF**)



Observation 1: TRR detects an aggressor row only among the first 2K ACT commands issued after a **TREF**

Observation 2: Rows activated earlier within the 2K ACT commands are more likely to be detected by TRR

TREF: Detects an aggressor row only among the first 2K ACT commands while favoring the earlier activations more

Circumventing Vendor C's TRR

Approach: Hammer dummy rows before aggressor rows to **maximize the probability** of TRR **detecting** a dummy row



Circumventing Vendor C's TRR by first hammering dummy rows to make aggressor rows less likely to be detected

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Bypassing TRR with New RowHammer Access Patterns

We craft **new RowHammer access patterns** that circumvent TRR of three major DRAM vendors

On the **45** DDR4 modules we test, the new access patterns cause a large number of RowHammer bit flips

Effect on Individual Rows



All 45 modules we tested are vulnerable
to our new RowHammer access patterns

Our RowHammer access patterns
cause bit flips in more than 99.9% of the rows

Why are some modules less vulnerable?

1) Fundamentally less vulnerable to RowHammer
2) Different TRR mechanisms
3) Unique row organization

Effect on Individual Rows



All 45 modules we tested are vulnerable
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Our RowHammer access patterns
cause bit flips in more than 99.9% of the rows

Our access patterns successfully **circumvent** the TRR implementations of **all three major DRAM vendors**

3) Unique row organization

Can ECC Protect Against Our Access Patterns?



Bypassing ECC with New RowHammer Patterns



Modules from all three vendors have many **8-byte data chunks** with 3 and more (up to 7) RowHammer bit flips

Conventional DRAM ECC cannot protect against our new RowHammer access patterns

Other Observations and Results in the Paper

- More observations on the TRRs of the three vendors
- Detailed description of the crafted access patterns
- Hammers per aggressor row sensitivity analysis
- Observations and results for individual modules
- …

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A8-9	20-07	8	1	16	8	12K-14K	A_{TRR1}	Counter-based	16	✓	1/9	4	74.6% - 75.0%	1.96 - 2.96
A10-12	19-51	8	1	16	8	12K-13K	A_{TRR1}	Counter-based	16	✓	1/9	4	74.6% - 75.0%	1.48 - 2.86
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C7-8	20-31	8	1	8	x16	40K-44K	C_{TRR1}	Mix	Unknown	✓	1/17	2	39.8% - 41.8%	9.66 - 14.56
C9-11	20-31	8	1	8	x16	42K-53K	C_{TRR2}	Mix	Unknown	✓	1/9	2	99.7%	9.30 - 32.04
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A new methodology that leverages *data retention failures* to uncover the inner workings of TRR and study its security



All 45 modules we test are **vulnerable**

99.9% of rows in a DRAM bank experience **at least one RowHammer bit flip**

Up to **7** RowHammer **bit flips** in an 8-byte dataword, **making ECC ineffective**

TRR does not provide security against RowHammer

U-TRR can facilitate the development of **new RowHammer attacks** and **more secure RowHammer protection** mechanisms

U-TRR

Uncovering in-DRAM RowHammer Protection Mechanisms: A New Methodology, Custom RowHammer Patterns, and Implications

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