

Future of Computer Architecture and Hardware Security

Onur Mutlu

omutlu@gmail.com

<https://people.inf.ethz.ch/omutlu>

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Microsoft Research

SAFARI

ETH zürich

Agenda

- Computer Architecture Today
 - What is it and where it is going
- Three Major Hardware Issues That Affect Security
 - Technology scaling problems
 - Growing system complexity; old methods not keeping up
 - New architectures and technologies

Why Do We Do Computing?

To Solve Problems

To Gain Insight

To Enable
a Better Life & Future


How Does a Computer Solve Problems?

Orchestrating Electrons

In today's dominant technologies

How Do Problems Get Solved by Electrons?

The Transformation Hierarchy



Computer Architecture

- is the **science** and **art** of designing **computing platforms** (hardware, interface, system SW, and programming model)
- to achieve a set of **design goals**
 - E.g., highest performance on earth on workloads X, Y, Z
 - E.g., longest battery life at a form factor that fits in your pocket with cost < \$\$\$ CHF
 - E.g., best average performance across all known workloads at the best performance/cost ratio
 - ...
- Designing a supercomputer is different from designing a smartphone → But, **many fundamental principles are similar**

Different Platforms, Different Goals



Different Platforms, Different Goals



Different Platforms, Different Goals



Different Platforms, Different Goals



Different Platforms, Different Goals

Mohammed Alser, Zülal Bingöl, Damla Senol Cali, Jeremie Kim, Saugata Ghose, Can Alkan, Onur Mutlu
[“Accelerating Genome Analysis: A Primer on an Ongoing Journey”](#) IEEE Micro, August 2020.



MinION from ONT

Accelerating Genome Analysis: A Primer on an Ongoing Journey

Sept.-Oct. 2020, pp. 65-75, vol. 40

DOI Bookmark: [10.1109/MM.2020.3013728](https://doi.org/10.1109/MM.2020.3013728)

FPGA-Based Near-Memory Acceleration of Modern Data-Intensive Applications


July-Aug. 2021, pp. 39-48, vol. 41

DOI Bookmark: [10.1109/MM.2021.3088396](https://doi.org/10.1109/MM.2021.3088396)



SmidgION from ONT

An Example System in Your Pocket



Apple M1 Ultra System (2022)

Different Platforms, Different Goals



Different Platforms, Different Goals



Jack Dongarra

Different Platforms, Different Goals



Different Platforms, Different Goals




Figure 3. TPU Printed Circuit Board. It can be inserted in the slot for an SATA disk in a server, but the card uses PCIe Gen3 x16.





Figure 4. Systolic data flow of the Matrix Multiply Unit. Software has the illusion that each 256B input is read at once, and they instantly update one location of each of 256 accumulator RAMs.

Jouppi et al., “In-Datcenter Performance Analysis of a Tensor Processing Unit”, ISCA 2017.


Different Platforms, Different Goals



New ML applications (vs. TPU3):

- Computer vision
- Natural Language Processing (NLP)
- Recommender system
- Reinforcement learning that plays Go

250 TFLOPS per chip in 2021
vs 90 TFLOPS in TPU3




1 ExaFLOPS per board

<https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/hardware/heres-how-googles-tpu-v4-ai-chip-stacked-up-in-training-tests>

Different Platforms, Different Goals

- ML accelerator: 260 mm², 6 billion transistors, 600 GFLOPS GPU, 12 ARM 2.2 GHz CPUs.
- Two redundant chips for better safety.



Different Platforms, Different Goals



■ Tesla Dojo Chip & System

D1 Chip


362 TFLOPs BF16/CFP8

22.6 TFLOPs FP32

10TBps/dir. On-Chip Bandwidth

4TBps/edge. Off-Chip Bandwidth

400W TDP



645mm²
7nm Technology

50 Billion
Transistors


11+ Miles
Of Wires

Different Platforms, Different Goals



■ Tesla Dojo Chip & System

Neural Network Training - Compute



2021: 3x Clusters

1752 GPUs
5PB NVME
Infiniband EDR

Auto-labelling

4032 GPUs
8PB NVME
Infiniband EDR

Training

5760 GPUs
12PB NVME
Infiniband HDR


Training




Different Platforms, Different Goals



■ Tesla Dojo Chip & System




Different Platforms, Different Goals




NVIDIA is claiming a **7x improvement** in dynamic programming algorithm (**DPX instructions**) performance on a single H100 versus naïve execution on an A100.

<https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/data-center/h100/>



Cerebras's Wafer Scale Engine (2019)



Cerebras WSE

1.2 Trillion transistors

46,225 mm²

- The largest ML accelerator chip
- 400,000 cores



Largest GPU

21.1 Billion transistors


815 mm²

NVIDIA TITAN V

<https://www.anandtech.com/show/14758/hot-chips-31-live-blogs-cerebras-wafer-scale-deep-learning>

<https://www.cerebras.net/cerebras-wafer-scale-engine-why-we-need-big-chips-for-deep-learning/>

Cerebras's Wafer Scale Engine-2 (2021)



Cerebras WSE-2
2.6 Trillion transistors
46,225 mm²

- The largest ML accelerator chip (2021)
- 850,000 cores



Largest GPU
54.2 Billion transistors
826 mm²

NVIDIA Ampere GA100

<https://www.anandtech.com/show/14758/hot-chips-31-live-blogs-cerebras-wafer-scale-deep-learning>

<https://www.cerebras.net/cerebras-wafer-scale-engine-why-we-need-big-chips-for-deep-learning/>

Many (Other) AI/ML Chips (2021)

■ MLPerf results available ■ AI-Benchmark results available

AI Chip Landscape

V0.7 Dec., 2019


S.T.



All information contained within this infographic is gathered from the internet and periodically updated, no guarantee is given that the information provided is correct, complete, and up-to-date.

To achieve the highest **efficiency, performance, robustness**:

we must take the expanded view
of computer architecture



Co-design across the hierarchy:
Algorithms to devices

Specialize as much as possible
within the design goals

What Limits Us in Computing Today?

Increasingly Demanding Applications

Dream...

and, they will come

As applications push boundaries, computing platforms become increasingly strained

Many Metrics to Optimize for

- Performance
- Energy/Power
- Correctness
- Robustness
- Cost
- Programming Ease
- Usability (Ease of Use)
- Scalability
- Simplicity (Complexity)
- ...

Challenging especially with complex systems & hardware

Three Major Limiters to Computing

- Technology scaling is not going well
- System complexity is increasing; old methods not keeping up
- Processor-centric designs are not keeping up
- These affect all metrics we care about
- These have fundamental impact on security and how we build secure systems

Technology Scaling

Technology Scaling Problems

- Circuit size and energy reduction has enabled continuous innovation at all levels of the computing stack
- As circuits become smaller, they become less reliable
- More flaky circuits are a problem for robust (reliable, safe, secure) operation
- If circuits produce wrong results, security can be affected (along with safety, reliability, availability)

How Reliable/Secure/Safe is This Bridge?



Collapse of the “Galloping Gertie”



Another View



How Secure Are These People?




Security is about preventing unforeseen consequences

How Safe & Secure Is **This** Platform?



How Robust Are These Platforms?



SAFARI

<https://www.kennedyspacecenter.com/explore-attractions/nasa-now>

<https://www.cnet.com/pictures/nasas-wildest-rides-extreme-vehicles-for-earth-and-beyond/7/>

Challenge and Opportunity for Future

Robust
(Reliable, Secure, Safe)

An Example: The RowHammer Problem

- One can **predictably induce bit flips** in commodity DRAM chips
 - All recent DRAM chips are fundamentally vulnerable
- First example of how a **simple hardware failure mechanism** can create a **widespread system security vulnerability**

WIRED

Forget Software—Now Hackers Are Exploiting Physics

BUSINESS	CULTURE	DESIGN	GEAR	SCIENCE
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ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 08.31.16 7:00 AM

SHARE



SHARE
18276



TWEET

FORGET SOFTWARE—NOW HACKERS ARE EXPLOITING PHYSICS

A Curious Phenomenon [Kim et al., ISCA 2014]


One can
predictably induce errors
in DRAM memory chips

Kim+, "[Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors](#)," ISCA 2014.




Rowhammer

Modern Memory is Prone to Disturbance Errors



Repeatedly reading a row enough times (before memory gets refreshed) induces **disturbance errors** in adjacent rows in **most real DRAM chips you can buy today**


Recent DRAM Is More Vulnerable




All modules from 2012-2013 are vulnerable

Higher-Level Implications


- This simple circuit level failure mechanism has enormous implications on upper layers of the transformation hierarchy





A Simple Program Can Induce Many Errors




```
loop:  
  mov  (X), %eax  
  mov  (Y), %ebx  
  clflush (X)  
  clflush (Y)  
  mfence  
  jmp  loop
```






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
1. Avoid *cache hits*
 - Flush **X** from cache
2. Avoid *row hits* to **X**
 - Read **Y** in another row






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
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


A Simple Program Can Induce Many Errors




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A Simple Program Can Induce Many Errors



```
loop:  
  mov  (X),  %eax  
  mov  (Y),  %ebx  
  clflush (X)  
  clflush (Y)  
  mfence  
  jmp  loop
```



Observed Errors in Real Systems

CPU Architecture	Errors	Access-Rate
Intel Haswell (2013)	22.9K	12.3M/sec
Intel Ivy Bridge (2012)	20.7K	11.7M/sec
Intel Sandy Bridge (2011)	16.1K	11.6M/sec
AMD Piledriver (2012)	59	6.1M/sec

A real reliability, security, safety issue

One Can Take Over an Otherwise-Secure System

Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors

Abstract. Memory isolation is a key property of a reliable and secure computing system — an access to one memory address should not have unintended side effects on data stored in other addresses. However, as DRAM process technology

Project Zero

Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them:
An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors
(Kim et al., ISCA 2014)

News and updates from the Project Zero team at Google

Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to
gain kernel privileges (Seaborn, 2015)

Monday, March 9, 2015

Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to gain kernel privileges

Many RowHammer Security Exploits

- One can exploit RowHammer to
- Take over a system
- Read data they do not have access to
- Break out of virtual machine sandboxes
- Corrupt important data → render ML inference useless
- Steal secret data (e.g., crypto keys & ML model parameters)

Security Implications



Security Implications



It's like breaking into an apartment by repeatedly slamming a neighbor's door until the vibrations open the door you were after

Infrastructures to Understand Such Issues




An Experimental Study of Data Retention Behavior in Modern DRAM Devices: Implications for Retention Time Profiling Mechanisms (Liu et al., ISCA 2013)

The Efficacy of Error Mitigation Techniques for DRAM Retention Failures: A Comparative Experimental Study (Khan et al., SIGMETRICS 2014)


Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors (Kim et al., ISCA 2014)

Adaptive-Latency DRAM: Optimizing DRAM Timing for the Common-Case (Lee et al., HPCA 2015)

AVATAR: A Variable-Retention-Time (VRT) Aware Refresh for DRAM Systems (Qureshi et al., DSN 2015)




Infrastructures to Understand Such Issues



SoftMC: Open Source DRAM Infrastructure

- Hasan Hassan et al., “**SoftMC: A Flexible and Practical Open-Source Infrastructure for Enabling Experimental DRAM Studies**,” HPCA 2017.
- Flexible
- Easy to Use (C++ API)
- Open-source
github.com/CMU-SAFARI/SoftMC



SoftMC: Open Source DRAM Infrastructure

- Hasan Hassan, Nandita Vijaykumar, Samira Khan, Saugata Ghose, Kevin Chang, Gennady Pekhimenko, Donghyuk Lee, Oguz Ergin, and Onur Mutlu,

"SoftMC: A Flexible and Practical Open-Source Infrastructure for Enabling Experimental DRAM Studies"

Proceedings of the 23rd International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA), Austin, TX, USA, February 2017.

[Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Lightning Session Slides (pptx) (pdf)]

[Full Talk Lecture (39 minutes)]

[Source Code]

SoftMC: A Flexible and Practical Open-Source Infrastructure for Enabling Experimental DRAM Studies

Hasan Hassan^{1,2,3} Nandita Vijaykumar³ Samira Khan^{4,3} Saugata Ghose³ Kevin Chang³
Gennady Pekhimenko^{5,3} Donghyuk Lee^{6,3} Oguz Ergin² Onur Mutlu^{1,3}

¹ETH Zürich ²TOBB University of Economics & Technology ³Carnegie Mellon University
⁴University of Virginia ⁵Microsoft Research ⁶NVIDIA Research

DRAM Bender: New DRAM Infrastructure

- Ataberk Olgun, Hasan Hassan, A Giray Yağlıkçı, Yahya Can Tuğrul, Lois Orosa, Haocong Luo, Minesh Patel, Oğuz Ergin, and Onur Mutlu,
"DRAM Bender: An Extensible and Versatile FPGA-based Infrastructure to Easily Test State-of-the-art DRAM Chips"
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems (TCAD), 2023.
[[Extended arXiv version](#)]
[[DRAM Bender Source Code](#)]
[[DRAM Bender Tutorial Video](#) (43 minutes)]






DRAM Bender: An Extensible and Versatile FPGA-based Infrastructure to Easily Test State-of-the-art DRAM Chips

Ataberk Olgun[§] Hasan Hassan[§] A. Giray Yağlıkçı[§] Yahya Can Tuğrul^{§†}
Lois Orosa^{§⊙} Haocong Luo[§] Minesh Patel[§] Oğuz Ergin[†] Onur Mutlu[§]
 [§]*ETH Zürich* [†]*TOBB ETÜ* [⊙]*Galician Supercomputing Center*

DRAM Bender: FPGA Prototypes

Testing Infrastructure	Protocol Support	FPGA Support
SoftMC [134]	DDR3	One Prototype
LiteX RowHammer Tester (LRT) [17]	DDR3/4, LPDDR4	Two Prototypes
DRAM Bender (this work)	DDR3/DDR4	Five Prototypes

Five out of the box FPGA-based prototypes



RowHammer [ISCA 2014]

- Yoongu Kim, Ross Daly, Jeremie Kim, Chris Fallin, Ji Hye Lee, Donghyuk Lee, Chris Wilkerson, Konrad Lai, and Onur Mutlu,
"Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors"

Proceedings of the 41st International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), Minneapolis, MN, June 2014.

[Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Lightning Session Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Source Code and Data] [Lecture Video (1 hr 49 mins), 25 September 2020]

One of the 7 papers of 2012-2017 selected as Top Picks in Hardware and Embedded Security for IEEE TCAD (link). Selected to the ISCA-50 25-Year Retrospective Issue covering 1996-2020 in 2023 (Retrospective (pdf) Full Issue). Winner of the 2024 IFIP Jean-Claude Laprie Award in dependable computing (link).

Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors

Yoongu Kim¹ Ross Daly* Jeremie Kim¹ Chris Fallin* Ji Hye Lee¹
Donghyuk Lee¹ Chris Wilkerson² Konrad Lai Onur Mutlu¹

¹Carnegie Mellon University ²Intel Labs

Memory Scaling Issues **Are** Real

- Onur Mutlu and Jeremie Kim,
"RowHammer: A Retrospective"
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems (TCAD) Special Issue on Top Picks in Hardware and Embedded Security, 2019.
[[Preliminary arXiv version](#)]
[[Slides from COSADE 2019 \(pptx\)](#)]
[[Slides from VLSI-SOC 2020 \(pptx\) \(pdf\)](#)]
[[Talk Video](#) (1 hr 15 minutes, with Q&A)]

RowHammer: A Retrospective

Onur Mutlu^{§‡} Jeremie S. Kim^{‡§}
§ETH Zürich ‡Carnegie Mellon University

Memory Scaling Issues **Are** Real

- Onur Mutlu, Ataberk Olgun, and A. Giray Yaglikci,
"Fundamentally Understanding and Solving RowHammer"
Invited Special Session Paper at the 28th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), Tokyo, Japan, January 2023.
[arXiv version]
[Slides (pptx) (pdf)]
[Talk Video (26 minutes)]

Fundamentally Understanding and Solving RowHammer

Onur Mutlu
onur.mutlu@safari.ethz.ch
ETH Zürich
Zürich, Switzerland

Ataberk Olgun
ataberk.olgund@safari.ethz.ch
ETH Zürich
Zürich, Switzerland

A. Giray Yağlıkçı
giray.yaglikci@safari.ethz.ch
ETH Zürich
Zürich, Switzerland

Main Memory Needs Intelligent Controllers

Industry's Intelligent DRAM Controllers (I)

ISSCC 2023 / SESSION 28 / HIGH-DENSITY MEMORIES /

28.8 A 1.1V 16Gb DDR5 DRAM with Probabilistic-Aggressor Tracking, Refresh-Management Functionality, Per-Row Hammer Tracking, a Multi-Step Precharge, and Core-Bias Modulation for Security and Reliability Enhancement

Woongrae Kim, Chulmoon Jung, Seongnyuh Yoo, Duckhwa Hong, Jeongjin Hwang, Jungmin Yoon, Ohyong Jung, Joonwoo Choi, Sanga Hyun, Mankeun Kang, Sangho Lee, Dohong Kim, Sanghyun Ku, Donhyun Choi, Nogeun Joo, Sangwoo Yoon, Junseok Noh, Byeongyong Go, Cheolhoe Kim, Sunil Hwang, Mihyun Hwang, Seol-Min Yi, Hyungmin Kim, Sanghyuk Heo, Yeonsu Jang, Kyoungchul Jang, Shinho Chu, Yoonna Oh, Kwidong Kim, Junghyun Kim, Soohwan Kim, Jeongtae Hwang, Sangil Park, Junphyo Lee, Inchul Jeong, Joohwan Cho, Jonghwan Kim

SK hynix Semiconductor, Icheon, Korea




Industry's Intelligent DRAM Controllers (II)

SK hynix Semiconductor, Icheon, Korea

DRAM products have been recently adopted in a wide range of high-performance computing applications: such as in cloud computing, in big data systems, and IoT devices. This demand creates larger memory capacity requirements, thereby requiring aggressive DRAM technology node scaling to reduce the cost per bit [1,2]. However, DRAM manufacturers are facing technology scaling challenges due to row hammer and refresh retention time beyond 1a-nm [2]. Row hammer is a failure mechanism, where repeatedly activating a DRAM row disturbs data in adjacent rows. Scaling down severely threatens reliability since a reduction of DRAM cell size leads to a reduction in the intrinsic row hammer tolerance [2,3]. To improve row hammer tolerance, there is a need to probabilistically activate adjacent rows with carefully sampled active addresses and to improve intrinsic row hammer tolerance [2]. In this paper, row-hammer-protection and refresh-management schemes are presented to guarantee DRAM security and reliability despite the aggressive scaling from 1a-nm to sub 10-nm nodes. The probabilistic-aggressor-tracking scheme with a refresh-management function (RFM) and per-row hammer tracking (PRHT) improve DRAM resilience. A multi-step precharge reinforces intrinsic row-hammer tolerance and a core-bias modulation improves retention time: even in the face of cell-transistor degradation due to technology scaling. This comprehensive scheme leads to a reduced probability of failure, due to row hammer attacks, by 93.1% and an improvement in retention time by 17%.

Industry's Intelligent DRAM Controllers (III)



ISSCC 2023 / SESSION 28 / HIGH-DENSITY MEMORIES

28.8 A 1.1V 16Gb DDR5 DRAM with Probabilistic-Aggressor Tracking, Refresh-Management Functionality, Per-Row Hammer Tracking, a Multi-Step Precharge, and Core-Bias Modulation for Security and Reliability Enhancement

Woongrae Kim, Chulmoon Jung, Seongnyuh Yoo, Duckhwa Hong, Jeongjin Hwang, Jungmin Yoon, Ohyoung Jung, Joonwoo Choi, Sanga Hyun, Mankeun Kang, Sangho Lee, Dohong Kim, Sanghyun Ku, Donhyun Choi, Nogeun Joo, Sangwoo Yoon, Junseok Noh, Byeongyong Go, Cheolhoe Kim, Sunil Hwang, Mihyun Hwang, Seol-Min Yi, Hyungmin Kim, Sanghyuk Heo, Yeonsu Jang, Kyoungchul Jang, Shinho Chu, Yoonna Oh, Kwidong Kim, Junghyun Kim, Soohwan Kim, Jeongtae Hwang, Sangil Park, Junphyo Lee, Inchul Jeong, Joohwan Cho, Jonghwan Kim

SK hynix Semiconductor, Icheon, Korea

DSAC: Low-Cost Rowhammer Mitigation Using In-DRAM Stochastic and Approximate Counting Algorithm

Seungki Hong Dongha Kim Jaehyung Lee Reum Oh
Changsik Yoo Sangjoon Hwang Jooyoung Lee

DRAM Design Team, Memory Division, Samsung Electronics


<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2302.03591v1.pdf>

Panopticon: A Complete In-DRAM Rowhammer Mitigation

Tanj Bennett[§], Stefan Saroiu, Alec Wolman, and Lucian Cojocar
Microsoft, [§]Avant-Gray LLC

<https://stefan.t8k2.com/publications/dramsec/2021/panopticon.pdf>

Recent Improvements in JEDEC (2024)



Global Standards for the Microelectronics Industry

STANDARDS & DOCUMENTS

COMMITTEES

NEWS

EVENTS & MEETINGS

JOIN

DDR5 SDRAM

JESD79-5C

Apr 2024

Release Number: Version 1.30

Version 1.30

This standard defines the DDR5 SDRAM specification, including features, functionalities, AC and DC characteristics, packages, and ball/signal assignments. The purpose of this Standard is to define the minimum set of requirements for JEDEC compliant 8 Gb through 32 Gb for x4, x8, and x16 DDR5 SDRAM devices. This standard was created based on the DDR4 standards (JESD79-4) and some aspects of the DDR, DDR2, DDR3, and LPDDR4 standards (JESD79, JESD79-2, JESD79-3, and JESD209-4).

Committee(s): [JC-42](#), [JC-42.3](#)

Evaluation of Industry's Recent Solutions

- **Appears at DRAMSec 2024**

Understanding the Security Benefits and Overheads of Emerging Industry Solutions to DRAM Read Disturbance

Oğuzhan Canpolat^{§†}

A. Giray Yağlıkçı[§]

Geraldo F. Oliveira[§]

Ataberk Olgun[§]

Oğuz Ergin[†]

Onur Mutlu[§]

[§]*ETH Zürich*

[†]*TOBB University of Economics and Technology*

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.19094>

<https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/ramulator2>

Are Solutions Good?



Are We Now BitFlip Free?

- **Appears at ISCA 2023**

What if there is another phenomenon that
does NOT require high row activation count?

RowPress: Amplifying Read-Disturbance in Modern DRAM Chips

Haocong Luo Ataberk Olgun A. Giray Yağlıkçı Yahya Can Tuğrul Steve Rhyner
Meryem Banu Cavlak Joël Lindegger Mohammad Sadrosadati Onur Mutlu
ETH Zürich



- Haocong Luo, Ataberk Olgun, Giray Yaglikci, Yahya Can Tugrul, Steve Rhyner, M. Banu Cavlak, Joel Lindegger, Mohammad Sadrosadati, and Onur Mutlu, **"RowPress: Amplifying Read Disturbance in Modern DRAM Chips"**

Proceedings of the 50th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), Orlando, FL, USA, June 2023.

[[Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[Lightning Talk Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[Lightning Talk Video](#) (3 minutes)]

[[RowPress Source Code and Datasets \(Officially Artifact Evaluated with All Badges\)](#)]

***Officially artifact evaluated as available, reusable and reproducible.
Best artifact award at ISCA 2023. IEEE Micro Top Pick in 2024.***

RowPress: Amplifying Read-Disturbance in Modern DRAM Chips

Haocong Luo Ataberk Olgun A. Giray Yağlıkçı Yahya Can Tuğrul Steve Rhyner
Meryem Banu Cavlak Joël Lindegger Mohammad Sadrosadati Onur Mutlu

ETH Zürich

What is RowPress?

Keeping a DRAM row **open for a long time** causes bitflips in adjacent rows

These bitflips do **NOT** require many row activations

Only one activation is enough in some cases!

Real DRAM Chip Characterization (II)

DRAM chips tested

- 164 DDR4 chips from all 3 major DRAM manufacturers
- Covers different die densities and revisions

Mfr.	#DIMMs	#Chips	Density	Die Rev.	Org.	Date
Mfr. S (Samsung)	2	8	8Gb	B	x8	20-53
	1	8	8Gb	C	x8	N/A
	3	8	8Gb	D	x8	21-10
	2	8	4Gb	F	x8	N/A
Mfr. H (SK Hynix)	1	8	4Gb	A	x8	19-46
	1	8	4Gb	X	x8	N/A
	2	8	16Gb	A	x8	20-51
	2	8	16Gb	C	x8	21-36
Mfr. M (Micron)	1	16	8Gb	B	x4	N/A
	2	4	16Gb	B	x16	21-26
	1	16	16Gb	E	x4	20-14
	2	4	16Gb	E	x16	20-46
	1	4	16Gb	F	x16	21-50

Major Takeaways from Real DRAM Chips


RowPress significantly **amplifies** DRAM's vulnerability to **read disturbance**

RowPress has a **different** underlying error **mechanism** from RowHammer

Key Characteristics of RowPress (I)

Amplifying Read Disturbance in DRAM

- Reduces the minimum number of row activations needed to induce a bitflip (AC_{min}) by **1-2 orders of magnitude**
- In extreme cases, activating a row **only once** induces bitflips



Real-System Demonstration (I)



Intel Core i5-10400
(Comet Lake)



Samsung DDR4 Module
M378A2K43CB1-CTD
(Date Code: 20-10)
w/ TRR RowHammer Mitigation

Key Idea: A proof-of-concept RowPress program keeps a DRAM row open for a longer period by **keeping on accessing different cache blocks in the row**



```
// Sync with Refresh and Loop Below
```

```
for (k = 0; k < NUM_AGGR_ACTS; k++)  
    for (j = 0; j < NUM_READS; j++) *AGGRESSOR1[j];  
    for (j = 0; j < NUM_READS; j++) *AGGRESSOR2[j];  
    for (j = 0; j < NUM_READS; j++)  
        clflushopt(AGGRESSOR1[j]);  
        clflushopt(AGGRESSOR2[j]);  
    mfence();  
    activate_dummy_rows();
```

**Number of Cache Blocks Accessed
Per Aggressor Row ACT
(NUM_READS=1 is Rowhammer)**

Real-System Demonstration (II)

On 1500 victim rows



Leveraging RowPress, our user-level program induces bitflips when RowHammer cannot

Combining RowHammer and RowPress

- **Appears at DSN Disrupt 2024**

An Experimental Characterization of Combined RowHammer and RowPress Read Disturbance in Modern DRAM Chips

Haocong Luo İsmail Emir Yüksel Ataberk Olgun A. Giray Yağlıkçı
Mohammad Sadrosadati Onur Mutlu
ETH Zürich

Combining RowHammer and RowPress

- **Appears at DIMVA 2024**

Presshammer: Rowhammer and Rowpress without Physical Address Information

Jonas Juffinger¹, Sudheendra Raghav Neela¹, Martin Heckel², Lukas Schwarz¹,
Florian Adamsky², and Daniel Gruss¹

¹ Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria

² Hof University of Applied Sciences, Hof, Germany

More to Come...

HBM Chips Are Also Vulnerable (2024)

- **Appears at DSN 2024**

Read Disturbance in High Bandwidth Memory: A Detailed Experimental Study on HBM2 DRAM Chips

Ataberk Olgun¹ Majd Osseiran¹ A. Giray Yağlıkçı¹ Yahya Can Tuğrul¹
Haocong Luo¹ Steve Rhyner¹ Behzad Salami² Juan Gomez Luna¹ Onur Mutlu¹
¹ETH Zürich ²BSC


<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.14665>

Key Takeaways

Read disturbance is a
technology scaling problem

Finding a good solution to
read disturbance is difficult
(and will become more so)

Reported HC_{first} Values (2012 – Now)



*Not shown: Significant variance in HC_{first} across vendors and die variations

RowPress at $t_{\text{AggON}} = \text{Refresh Interval}$

HC_{first} : Number of hammers for the first bitflip*



*Not shown: Significant variance in HC_{first} across vendors and die variations

RowPress at $t_{\text{AggON}} = 9 * \text{Refresh Interval}$

$\text{HC}_{\text{first}} = \infty$
(all good)

$\text{HC}_{\text{first}} \text{ Scale}^*$

$\text{HC}_{\text{first}} = 1$
(DRAM is doomed)

row on time = 70.2 us
DDR4-new @ **51**
[Luo+, ISCA'23]

row on time = 35.1 us
HBM2-20nm @ **123**
[Olgun+, DSN'24]

*Not shown: Significant variance in HC_{first} across vendors and die variations

A Recent RowHammer Lecture

What Is RowHammer?

- One can **predictably induce bit flips** in commodity DRAM chips
 - >80% of the tested DRAM chips are vulnerable
- First example of how a **simple hardware failure mechanism** can create a **widespread system security vulnerability**

WIRED Forget Software—Now Hackers Are Exploiting Physics

BUSINESS CULTURE DESIGN GEAR SCIENCE

ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 08.31.16 7:00 AM

FORGET SOFTWARE—NOW HACKERS ARE EXPLOITING PHYSICS

Stanford

Stanford Seminar - RowHammer, RowPress and Beyond: Can We Be Free of Bitflips (Soon)?

Stanford Online 529K subscribers

Subscribed

35

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1.2K views 1 month ago

Emerging Memories Also Need Intelligent Controllers

- Benjamin C. Lee, Engin Ipek, Onur Mutlu, and Doug Burger,
"Architecting Phase Change Memory as a Scalable DRAM Alternative"
Proceedings of the 36th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), pages 2-13, Austin, TX, June 2009. [Slides \(pdf\)](#)
One of the 13 computer architecture papers of 2009 selected as Top Picks by IEEE Micro. Selected as a CACM Research Highlight. 2022 Persistent Impact Prize.

Architecting Phase Change Memory as a Scalable DRAM Alternative

Benjamin C. Lee[†] Engin Ipek[†] Onur Mutlu[‡] Doug Burger[†]

[†]Computer Architecture Group
Microsoft Research
Redmond, WA
{blee, ipek, dburger}@microsoft.com

[‡]Computer Architecture Laboratory
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA
onur@cmu.edu

Intelligent
Memory Controllers
Can Enhance Security
& Enable Better Scaling

Data Corruption is in CPU Logic, Too

- Intermittent defects can cause silent data corruption
- They may be hard to detect or replicate
- They may be exploitable

Silent Data Corruption in Logic (2021)

Silent Data Corruptions at Scale

Harish Dattatraya
Dixit
Facebook, Inc.
hdd@fb.com

Sneha Pendharkar
Facebook, Inc.
spendharkar@fb.com

Matt Beadon
Facebook, Inc.
mbeadon@fb.com

Chris Mason
Facebook, Inc.
clm@fb.com

Tejasvi Chakravarthy
Facebook, Inc.
teju@fb.com

Bharath Muthiah
Facebook, Inc.
bharathm@fb.com

Sriram Sankar
Facebook Inc.
sriramsankar@fb.com

Cores that don't count

Peter H. Hochschild
Paul Turner
Jeffrey C. Mogul
Google
Sunnyvale, CA, US

Rama Govindaraju
Parthasarathy
Ranganathan
Google
Sunnyvale, CA, US

David E. Culler
Amin Vahdat
Google
Sunnyvale, CA, US

Silent Data Corruption In-the-Field (2021)

We have a *new* problem: cores that disobey instructions

CPU cores that


- repeatedly
- but not always
- mis-calculate
- certain computations
- without giving any obvious signal

"Mercurial cores" committing

"Corrupt Execution Errors"

Due to local silicon defects, not eg cosmic rays

Google



0:19 / 9:14 • We have a new problem: cores that disobey instructions >

HotOS 2021: Cores That Don't Count (Fun Hardware)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMF3rqhjYuM>

Silent Data Corruption in Logic (2023)

Understanding Silent Data Corruptions in a Large Production CPU Population

Shaobu Wang
Tsinghua University

Guangyan Zhang*
Tsinghua University

Junyu Wei
Tsinghua University

Yang Wang
The Ohio State University

Jiesheng Wu
Alibaba Cloud

Qingchao Luo
Alibaba Cloud

Understanding and Mitigating Hardware Failures in Deep Learning Training Accelerator Systems

Yi He
University of Chicago
Chciago, IL, USA
yiizy@uchicago.edu

Mike Hutton
Google
Sunnyvale, CA, USA
mdhutton@google.com

Steven Chan
Google
Sunnyvale, CA, USA
scchan@google.com

Robert de Gruijl
Google
Sunnyvale, CA, USA
rdegruijl@google.com

Rama Govindaraju
Google
Sunnyvale, CA, USA
govindaraju@google.com

Nishant Patil
Google
Sunnyvale, CA, USA
nishantpatil@google.com

Yanjing Li
University of Chicago
Chciago, IL, USA
yanjingl@uchicago.edu

Takeaways

- Both memory and logic errors will become worse with technology scaling
- Hardware errors will create worse robustness problems
- **We cannot afford to ignore data corruption**

System Complexity

Complex Systems Cause Many Issues

- Many hardware components, complex components
- Harder to design & verify
- Harder to reason about operational behavior
 - Correctness, performance, energy, security, privacy, ...
- Harder to control interactions between components and avoid information leakage
- Old methods do not keep up with new trends and complexity
 - Virtual memory is a prime example


Processor Complexity Is Growing

Moore's Law: The number of transistors on microchips doubles every two years

Moore's law describes the empirical regularity that the number of transistors on integrated circuits doubles approximately every two years. This advancement is important for other aspects of technological progress in computing – such as processing speed or the price of computers.

Our World
in Data

Transistor count



Data source: Wikipedia (wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor_count)

OurWorldinData.org – Research and data to make progress against the world's largest problems.

Licensed under CC-BY by the authors Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser.

Complex CPUs and Memory Hierarchies




10nm ESF=Intel 7 Alder Lake die shot (~209mm²) from Intel: <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/newsroom/news/12th-gen-core-processors.html>

Die shot interpretation by Locuza, October 2021

Intel Alder Lake,
2021

Complex CPUs and Memory Hierarchies



Core Count:
8 cores/16 threads


L1 Caches:
32 KB per core

L2 Caches:
512 KB per core

L3 Cache:
32 MB shared

AMD Ryzen 5000, 2020

Complexity Growing with 3D (2021)




<https://community.microcenter.com/discussion/5134/comparing-zen-3-to-zen-2>

AMD increases the L3 size of their 8-core Zen 3 processors from 32 MB to 96 MB

Additional 64 MB L3 cache die
stacked on top of the processor die

- Connected using Through Silicon Vias (TSVs)
- Total of 96 MB L3 cache



Processor Complexity and Features

- Leads to **many (endless) side and covert channels**
 - Spectre and Meltdown are prime recent examples
 - These will not go away
- Leads to **many bugs and unintended behavior**
 - Especially with new features or complex interactions
 - Some can be exploitable
- **How to tame processor complexity & resulting issues?**

Access Control & Protection Mechanisms

- Are based on **virtual memory (VM)**, invented in 1950s
- VM has not changed much even after decades of technology scaling and memory system improvements
- VM causes **large performance problems** and is responsible for **large complexity, power, energy**
- VM is **poor for fine-grained security** and access control
- VM **hinders innovation** in heterogeneous (e.g., accelerator) systems and **new architectures** (e.g., processing near data)
- **It is time to rethink virtual memory**

Virtual Memory: Parting Thoughts

- Virtual Memory is one of the most successful examples of
 - ❑ architectural support for programmers
 - ❑ how to partition work between hardware and software
 - ❑ hardware/software cooperation
 - ❑ programmer/architect tradeoff
- Going forward: How does virtual memory fare and scale into the future? Five key trends:
 - ❑ Increasing, huge physical memory sizes (local & remote)
 - ❑ Hybrid physical memory systems (DRAM + NVM + SSD)
 - ❑ Many accelerators in the system accessing physical memory
 - ❑ Virtualized systems (hypervisors, software virtualization, local and remote memories)
 - ❑ Processing in memory systems – near-data accelerators

Rethinking Virtual Memory

Nastaran Hajinazar, Pratyush Patel, Minesh Patel, Konstantinos Kanellopoulos, Saugata Ghose, Rachata Ausavarungnirun, Geraldo Francisco de Oliveira Jr., Jonathan Appavoo, Vivek Seshadri, and Onur Mutlu, **"The Virtual Block Interface: A Flexible Alternative to the Conventional Virtual Memory Framework"**

Proceedings of the 47th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), Virtual, June 2020.

[[Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[Lightning Talk Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[ARM Research Summit Poster \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[Talk Video](#) (26 minutes)]

[[Lightning Talk Video](#) (3 minutes)]

[[Lecture Video](#) (43 minutes)]

The Virtual Block Interface: A Flexible Alternative to the Conventional Virtual Memory Framework

Nastaran Hajinazar^{*†} Pratyush Patel[⌘] Minesh Patel^{*} Konstantinos Kanellopoulos^{*} Saugata Ghose[‡]
Rachata Ausavarungnirun[⊙] Geraldo F. Oliveira^{*} Jonathan Appavoo[◇] Vivek Seshadri[▽] Onur Mutlu^{*‡}

^{*}ETH Zürich [†]Simon Fraser University [⌘]University of Washington [‡]Carnegie Mellon University

[⊙]King Mongkut's University of Technology North Bangkok [◇]Boston University [▽]Microsoft Research India

Better Virtual Memory (I)

Konstantinos Kanellopoulos, Hong Chul Nam, F. Nisa Bostanci, Rahul Bera, Mohammad Sadrosadati, Rakesh Kumar, Davide Basilio Bartolini, and Onur Mutlu,

"Victima: Drastically Increasing Address Translation Reach by Leveraging Underutilized Cache Resources"

Proceedings of the 56th International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO), Toronto, ON, Canada, November 2023.

[[Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[arXiv version](#)]

[[Victima Source Code](#) (Officially Artifact Evaluated with All Badges)]

***Officially artifact evaluated as available, functional, reusable and reproducible.
Distinguished artifact award at MICRO 2023.***

Victima: Drastically Increasing Address Translation Reach by Leveraging Underutilized Cache Resources

Konstantinos Kanellopoulos¹ Hong Chul Nam¹ F. Nisa Bostanci¹ Rahul Bera¹
Mohammad Sadrosadati¹ Rakesh Kumar² Davide Basilio Bartolini³ Onur Mutlu¹

¹ETH Zürich ²Norwegian University of Science and Technology ³Huawei Zurich Research Center

Better Virtual Memory (II)

Konstantinos Kanellopoulos, Rahul Bera, Kosta Stojiljkovic, Nisa Bostanci, Can Firtina, Rachata Ausavarungnirun, Rakesh Kumar, Nastaran Hajinazar, Mohammad Sadrosadati, Nandita Vijaykumar, and Onur Mutlu,

"Utopia: Fast and Efficient Address Translation via Hybrid Restrictive & Flexible Virtual-to-Physical Address Mappings"

Proceedings of the 56th International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO), Toronto, ON, Canada, November 2023.

[[Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[arXiv version](#)]

[[Utopia Source Code](#)]

Utopia: Fast and Efficient Address Translation via Hybrid Restrictive & Flexible Virtual-to-Physical Address Mappings

Konstantinos Kanellopoulos¹ Rahul Bera¹ Kosta Stojiljkovic¹ Nisa Bostanci¹ Can Firtina¹
Rachata Ausavarungnirun² Rakesh Kumar³ Nastaran Hajinazar⁴ Mohammad Sadrosadati¹
Nandita Vijaykumar⁵ Onur Mutlu¹

¹ETH Zürich ²King Mongkut's University of Technology North Bangkok

³Norwegian University of Science and Technology ⁴Intel Labs ⁵University of Toronto

New Architectures & Technologies

New Architectures & Technologies

- Can have large impact on security and robustness
 - Positive or negative
- They need to be designed with system security in mind
 - Ideally as a first-class design goal
- Multiple potentially paradigm-changing new technologies and architectures
 - Processing in memory
 - Accelerator-based computing
 - Quantum computing

Processing in Memory

Computing

is Bottlenecked by Data

Data is Key for AI, ML, Genomics, ...


- Important workloads are all data intensive
- They require rapid and efficient processing of large amounts of data
- Data is increasing
 - We can generate more than we can process
 - We need to perform more sophisticated analyses on more data

Huge Demand for Performance & Efficiency

Exponential Growth of Neural Networks




Memory and compute requirements



1800x more compute
In just **2 years**

Tomorrow, **multi-trillion**
parameter models

Huge Demand for Performance & Efficiency




development of new sequencing technologies



Oxford Nanopore MinION

Number of Genomes Sequenced



The Economist

Do We Want This?



Or This?



High Performance,

Energy Efficient,

Sustainable

(All at the Same Time)


The Problem

Data access is the major performance and energy bottleneck

Our current
design principles
cause great energy waste
(and great performance loss)

Today's Computing Systems

- Processor centric
- All data processed in the processor → at great system cost



It's the Memory, Stupid!

- **"It's the Memory, Stupid!"** (Richard Sites, MPR, 1996)

RICHARD SITES


It's the Memory, Stupid!

When we started the Alpha architecture design in 1988, we estimated a 25-year lifetime and a relatively modest 32% per year compounded performance improvement of implementations over that lifetime (1,000× total). We guestimated about 10× would come from CPU clock improvement, 10× from multiple instruction issue, and 10× from multiple processors.

5, 1996  MICROPROCESSOR REPORT


I expect that over the coming decade memory subsystem design will be the *only* important design issue for microprocessors.

Processor-Centric System Performance



Processor-Centric System Performance


- All of Google's Data Center Workloads (2015):



Data Movement vs. Computation Energy


Communication Dominates Arithmetic

Dally, HiPEAC 2015




A memory access consumes $\sim 100-1000X$ the energy of a complex addition

Data Movement vs. Computation Energy



Data Movement vs. Computation Energy



A memory access consumes 6400X the energy of a simple integer addition

Energy Waste in Mobile Devices

- Amirali Boroumand, Saugata Ghose, Youngsok Kim, Rachata Ausavarungnirun, Eric Shiu, Rahul Thakur, Daehyun Kim, Aki Kuusela, Allan Knies, Parthasarathy Ranganathan, and Onur Mutlu, ["Google Workloads for Consumer Devices: Mitigating Data Movement Bottlenecks"](#) *Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS)*, Williamsburg, VA, USA, March 2018.

62.7% of the total system energy
is spent on **data movement**

Google Workloads for Consumer Devices: Mitigating Data Movement Bottlenecks

Amirali Boroumand¹

Saugata Ghose¹

Youngsok Kim²

Rachata Ausavarungnirun¹

Eric Shiu³

Rahul Thakur³

Daehyun Kim^{4,3}

Aki Kuusela³

Allan Knies³

Parthasarathy Ranganathan³

Onur Mutlu^{5,1}

Energy Waste in Accelerators

- Amirali Boroumand, Saugata Ghose, Berkin Akin, Ravi Narayanaswami, Geraldo F. Oliveira, Xiaoyu Ma, Eric Shiu, and Onur Mutlu,
["Google Neural Network Models for Edge Devices: Analyzing and Mitigating Machine Learning Inference Bottlenecks"](#)
Proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Parallel Architectures and Compilation Techniques (PACT), Virtual, September 2021.
[[Slides \(pptx\)](#)] ([pdf](#))
[[Talk Video](#) (14 minutes)]

**> 90% of the total system energy
is spent on **memory** in large ML models**

Google Neural Network Models for Edge Devices: Analyzing and Mitigating Machine Learning Inference Bottlenecks

Amirali Boroumand^{†◇}
Geraldo F. Oliveira^{*}

Saugata Ghose[‡]
Xiaoyu Ma[§]

Berkin Akin[§]
Eric Shiu[§]

Ravi Narayanaswami[§]
Onur Mutlu^{*†}

[†]Carnegie Mellon Univ.


[◇]Stanford Univ.

[‡]Univ. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

[§]Google

^{*}ETH Zürich

Example Energy Breakdowns




**In LSTMs and Transducers used by Google,
>90% energy spent on off-chip interconnect and DRAM**

Processing of data
is performed
far away from the data

We Need A Paradigm Shift To ...


- Enable computation with minimal data movement
- Compute where it makes sense (where data resides)
- Make computing architectures more data-centric

Process Data Where It Makes Sense




Apple M1 Ultra System (2022)

Memory as an Accelerator



Memory similar to a "conventional" accelerator

Goal: Processing Inside Memory/Storage




- Many questions ... How do we design the:
 - ❑ compute-capable memory & controllers?
 - ❑ processors & communication units?
 - ❑ software & hardware interfaces?
 - ❑ system software, compilers, languages?
 - ❑ algorithms & theoretical foundations?

Problem
Algorithm
Program/Language
System Software
SW/HW Interface
Micro-architecture
Logic
Devices
Electrons



Processing in Memory: Two Types

1. Processing **near** Memory
2. Processing **using** Memory


Processing-in-Memory Landscape Today




[Samsung 2021]




[Alibaba 2022]



[SK Hynix 2022]



[Samsung 2021]



[UPMEM 2019]

Processing-in-Memory Landscape Today

IEEE COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE LETTERS, VOL. 22, NO. 1, JANUARY-JUNE

Computational CXL-Memory Solution for Accelerating Memory-Intensive Applications

Joonseop Sim^{ID}, Soohong Ahn^{ID}, Taeyoung Ahn^{ID},
Seungyong Lee^{ID}, Myunghyun Rhee, Jooyoung Kim^{ID},
Kwangsik Shin, Donguk Moon^{ID},
Euseok Kim, and Kyoung Park^{ID}

Abstract—CXL interface is the up-to-date technology that enables effective memory expansion by providing a memory-sharing protocol in configuring heterogeneous devices. However, its limited physical bandwidth can be a significant bottleneck for emerging data-intensive applications. In this work, we propose a novel CXL-based memory disaggregation architecture with a real-world prototype demonstration, which overcomes the bandwidth limitation of the CXL interface using near-data processing. The experimental results demonstrate that our design achieves up to $1.9\times$ better performance/power efficiency than the existing CPU system.

Index Terms—Compute express link (CXL), near-data-processing (NDP)




Fig. 6. FPGA prototype of proposed CMS card.

Processing-in-Memory Landscape Today

Samsung Processing in Memory Technology at Hot Chips 2023

By Patrick Kennedy - August 28, 2023




Samsung PIM PNM For Transformer Based AI HC35_Page_24

Opportunity: 3D-Stacked Logic+Memory



Hybrid Memory Cube
C O N S O R T I U M




Memory

Logic

Other "True 3D" technologies
under development


Tesseract System for Graph Processing

Interconnected set of 3D-stacked memory+logic chips with simple cores




Tesseract Graph Processing Performance

>13X Performance Improvement



Tesseract Graph Processing System Energy



Processing using DRAM

- We can support
 - Bulk bitwise AND, OR, NOT, MAJ
 - Bulk bitwise COPY and INIT/ZERO
 - True Random Number Generation; Physical Unclonable Functions
 - More complex computation using Lookup Tables
- At low cost
- Using analog computation capability of DRAM
 - Idea: activating (multiple) rows performs computation
 - Even in commodity off-the-shelf DRAM chips!
- 30X-257X performance and energy improvements

Seshadri+, "RowClone: Fast and Efficient In-DRAM Copy and Initialization of Bulk Data," MICRO 2013.


Seshadri+, "Fast Bulk Bitwise AND and OR in DRAM", IEEE CAL 2015.

Seshadri+, "Ambit: In-Memory Accelerator for Bulk Bitwise Operations Using Commodity DRAM Technology," MICRO 2017.

Hajinazar+, "SIMDRAM: A Framework for Bit-Serial SIMD Processing using DRAM," ASPLOS 2021.

Oliveira+, "MIMDRAM: An End-to-End Processing-Using-DRAM System for High-Throughput, Energy-Efficient and Programmer-Transparent Multiple-Instruction Multiple-Data Processing," HPCA 2024.

Future Systems: In-Memory Copy



1046ns, 3.6uJ → 90ns, 0.04uJ

More on RowClone

- Vivek Seshadri, Yoongu Kim, Chris Fallin, Donghyuk Lee, Rachata Ausavarungnirun, Gennady Pekhimenko, Yixin Luo, Onur Mutlu, Michael A. Kozuch, Phillip B. Gibbons, and Todd C. Mowry,
"RowClone: Fast and Energy-Efficient In-DRAM Bulk Data Copy and Initialization"
Proceedings of the 46th International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO), Davis, CA, December 2013. [[Slides \(pptx\)](#)] [[pdf](#)] [[Lightning Session Slides \(pptx\)](#)] [[pdf](#)] [[Poster \(pptx\)](#)] [[pdf](#)]

RowClone: Fast and Energy-Efficient In-DRAM Bulk Data Copy and Initialization


Vivek Seshadri Yoongu Kim Chris Fallin* Donghyuk Lee
vseshadr@cs.cmu.edu yoongukim@cmu.edu cfallin@c1f.net donghyuk1@cmu.edu

Rachata Ausavarungnirun Gennady Pekhimenko Yixin Luo
rachata@cmu.edu gpekhime@cs.cmu.edu yixinluo@andrew.cmu.edu

Onur Mutlu Phillip B. Gibbons† Michael A. Kozuch† Todd C. Mowry
onur@cmu.edu phillip.b.gibbons@intel.com michael.a.kozuch@intel.com tcm@cs.cmu.edu

Carnegie Mellon University †Intel Pittsburgh

In-DRAM AND/OR: Triple Row Activation



Final State
 $AB + BC + AC$

**$C(A + B) +$
 $\sim C(AB)$**

More on Ambit

- Vivek Seshadri, Donghyuk Lee, Thomas Mullins, Hasan Hassan, Amirali Boroumand, Jeremie Kim, Michael A. Kozuch, Onur Mutlu, Phillip B. Gibbons, and Todd C. Mowry,
["Ambit: In-Memory Accelerator for Bulk Bitwise Operations Using Commodity DRAM Technology"](#)
Proceedings of the 50th International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO), Boston, MA, USA, October 2017.
[\[Slides \(pptx\) \(pdf\)\]](#) [\[Lightning Session Slides \(pptx\) \(pdf\)\]](#) [\[Poster \(pptx\) \(pdf\)\]](#)

Ambit: In-Memory Accelerator for Bulk Bitwise Operations Using Commodity DRAM Technology

Vivek Seshadri^{1,5} Donghyuk Lee^{2,5} Thomas Mullins^{3,5} Hasan Hassan⁴ Amirali Boroumand⁵
Jeremie Kim^{4,5} Michael A. Kozuch³ Onur Mutlu^{4,5} Phillip B. Gibbons⁵ Todd C. Mowry⁵

¹Microsoft Research India ²NVIDIA Research ³Intel ⁴ETH Zürich ⁵Carnegie Mellon University

Existing DRAM Chips
Are Already Quite Capable

Real Processing Using Memory Prototype

- End-to-end RowClone & TRNG using off-the-shelf DRAM chips
- Idea: Violate DRAM timing parameters to mimic RowClone

PiDRAM: A Holistic End-to-end FPGA-based Framework for Processing-in-DRAM

Ataberk Olgun^{§†}

Juan Gómez Luna[§]
Hasan Hassan[§]

Konstantinos Kanellopoulos[§]
Oğuz Ergin[†] Onur Mutlu[§]

Behzad Salami^{§*}

[§]ETH Zürich

[†]TOBB ETÜ


^{*}BSC

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.00082.pdf>

<https://github.com/cmu-safari/pidram>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeukNs5XI3g&t=4192s>

Real Processing-using-Memory Prototype



<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.00082.pdf>

<https://github.com/cmu-safari/pidram>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeukNs5XI3g&t=4192s>

Real Processing-using-Memory Prototype

☰ README.md

Building a PiDRAM Prototype

To build PiDRAM's prototype on Xilinx ZC706 boards, developers need to use the two sub-projects in this directory. `fpga-zynq` is a repository branched off of [UCB-BAR's fpga-zynq](#) repository. We use `fpga-zynq` to generate rocket chip designs that support end-to-end DRAM PuM execution. `controller-hardware` is where we keep the main Vivado project and Verilog sources for PiDRAM's memory controller and the top level system design.

Rebuilding Steps

1. Navigate into `fpga-zynq` and read the README file to understand the overall workflow of the repository
 - Follow the readme in `fpga-zynq/rocket-chip/riscv-tools` to install dependencies
2. Create the Verilog source of the rocket chip design using the `ZynqCopyFPGAConfig`
 - Navigate into `zc706`, then run `make rocket CONFIG=ZynqCopyFPGAConfig -j<number of cores>`
3. Copy the generated Verilog file (should be under `zc706/src`) and overwrite the same file in `controller-hardware/source/hdl/impl/rocket-chip`
4. Open the Vivado project in `controller-hardware/Vivado_Project` using Vivado 2016.2
5. Generate a bitstream
6. Copy the bitstream (`system_top.bit`) to `fpga-zynq/zc706`
7. Use the `./build_script.sh` to generate the new `boot.bin` under `fpga-images-zc706`, you can use this file to program the FPGA using the SD-Card
 - For details, follow the relevant instructions in `fpga-zynq/README.md`

You can run programs compiled with the RISC-V Toolchain supplied within the `fpga-zynq` repository. To install the toolchain, follow the instructions under `fpga-zynq/rocket-chip/riscv-tools`.

Generating DDR3 Controller IP sources

We cannot provide the sources for the Xilinx PHY IP we use in PiDRAM's memory controller due to licensing issues. We describe here how to regenerate them using Vivado 2016.2. First, you need to generate the IP RTL files:


- 1- Open IP Catalog
- 2- Find "Memory Interface Generator (MIG 7 Series)" IP and double click

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.00082.pdf>

<https://github.com/cmu-safari/pidram>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeukNs5XI3g&t=4192s>

Microbenchmark Copy/Initialization Throughput



**In-DRAM Copy and Initialization
improve throughput by 119x and 89x**

More on PiDRAM

- Ataberk Olgun, Juan Gomez Luna, Konstantinos Kanellopoulos, Behzad Salami, Hasan Hassan, Oguz Ergin, and Onur Mutlu,
["PiDRAM: A Holistic End-to-end FPGA-based Framework for Processing-in-DRAM"](#)
[ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization \(TACO\)](#), March 2023.
[\[arXiv version\]](#)
Presented at the [18th HiPEAC Conference](#), Toulouse, France, January 2023.
[\[Slides \(pptx\) \(pdf\)\]](#)
[\[Longer Lecture Slides \(pptx\) \(pdf\)\]](#)
[\[Lecture Video \(40 minutes\)\]](#)
[\[PiDRAM Source Code\]](#)

PiDRAM: A Holistic End-to-end FPGA-based Framework for Processing-in-DRAM

Ataberk Olgun[§] Juan Gómez Luna[§] Konstantinos Kanellopoulos[§] Behzad Salami[§]
Hasan Hassan[§] Oğuz Ergin[†] Onur Mutlu[§]

[§]*ETH Zürich*

[†]*TOBB University of Economics and Technology*

DRAM Chips Are Already (Quite) Capable!

- **Appears at HPCA 2024** <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.18736.pdf>

Functionally-Complete Boolean Logic in Real DRAM Chips: Experimental Characterization and Analysis

İsmail Emir Yüksel Yahya Can Tuğrul Ataberk Olgun F. Nisa Bostancı A. Giray Yağlıkçı
Geraldo F. Oliveira Haocong Luo Juan Gómez-Luna Mohammad Sadrosadati Onur Mutlu

ETH Zürich

We experimentally demonstrate that COTS DRAM chips are capable of performing 1) functionally-complete Boolean operations: NOT, NAND, and NOR and 2) many-input (i.e., more than two-input) AND and OR operations. We present an extensive characterization of new bulk bitwise operations in 256 off-the-shelf modern DDR4 DRAM chips. We evaluate the reliability of these operations using a metric called success rate: the fraction of correctly performed bitwise operations. Among our 19 new observations, we highlight four major results. First, we can perform the NOT operation on COTS DRAM chips with 98.37% success rate on average. Second, we can perform up to 16-input NAND, NOR, AND, and OR operations on COTS DRAM chips with high reliability (e.g., 16-input NAND, NOR, AND, and OR with average success rate of 94.94%, 95.87%, 94.94%, and 95.85%, respectively). Third, data pattern only slightly


The Capability of COTS DRAM Chips

We demonstrate that COTS DRAM chips:

- 1 Can simultaneously activate up to 48 rows in two neighboring subarrays
- 2 Can perform **NOT operation** with up to **32 output operands**
- 3 Can perform up to **16-input AND, NAND, OR, and NOR** operations


Key Idea: NOT Operation

Connect rows in neighboring subarrays through a **NOT gate** by simultaneously activating rows



Key Idea: NAND, NOR, AND, OR

Manipulate the bitline voltage to express
a wide variety of functions using
multiple-row activation in neighboring subarrays




DRAM Chips Tested

- 256 DDR4 chips from two major DRAM manufacturers
- Covers different die revisions and chip densities


Chip Mfr.	#Modules (#Chips)	Die Rev.	Mfr. Date ^a	Chip Density	Chip Org.	Speed Rate
SK Hynix	9 (72)	M	N/A	4Gb	x8	2666MT/s
	5 (40)	A	N/A	4Gb	x8	2133MT/s
	1 (16)	A	N/A	8Gb	x8	2666MT/s
	1 (32)	A	18-14	4Gb	x4	2400MT/s
	1 (32)	A	16-49	8Gb	x4	2400MT/s
	1 (32)	M	16-22	8Gb	x4	2666MT/s
Samsung	1 (8)	F	21-02	4Gb	x8	2666MT/s
	2 (16)	D	21-10	8Gb	x8	2133MT/s
	1 (8)	A	22-12	8Gb	x8	3200MT/s

Performing AND, NAND, OR, and NOR



COTS DRAM chips can perform {2, 4, 8, 16}-input AND, NAND, OR, and NOR operations

Performing AND, NAND, OR, and NOR



**COTS DRAM chips can perform
16-input AND, NAND, OR, and NOR operations
with very high success rate (>94%)**

In-DRAM Physical Unclonable Functions

- Jeremie S. Kim, Minesh Patel, Hasan Hassan, and Onur Mutlu,
"The DRAM Latency PUF: Quickly Evaluating Physical Unclonable Functions by Exploiting the Latency-Reliability Tradeoff in Modern DRAM Devices"
Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA), Vienna, Austria, February 2018.
[[Lightning Talk Video](#)]
[[Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))] [[Lightning Session Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]
[[Full Talk Lecture Video](#) (28 minutes)]

The DRAM Latency PUF:

Quickly Evaluating Physical Unclonable Functions

by Exploiting the Latency-Reliability Tradeoff in Modern Commodity DRAM Devices

Jeremie S. Kim^{†§}

Minesh Patel[§]

Hasan Hassan[§]

Onur Mutlu^{§†}

[†]Carnegie Mellon University

[§]ETH Zürich

In-DRAM True Random Number Generation

- Jeremie S. Kim, Minesh Patel, Hasan Hassan, Lois Orosa, and Onur Mutlu,
"D-RaNGe: Using Commodity DRAM Devices to Generate True Random Numbers with Low Latency and High Throughput"

Proceedings of the 25th International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA), Washington, DC, USA, February 2019.

[[Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[Full Talk Video](#) (21 minutes)]

[[Full Talk Lecture Video](#) (27 minutes)]

Top Picks Honorable Mention by IEEE Micro.

D-RaNGe: Using Commodity DRAM Devices to Generate True Random Numbers with Low Latency and High Throughput

Jeremie S. Kim^{‡§}

Minesh Patel[§]

Hasan Hassan[§]

Lois Orosa[§]

Onur Mutlu^{§‡}

[‡]Carnegie Mellon University

[§]ETH Zürich

In-DRAM True Random Number Generation

- Ataberk Olgun, Minesh Patel, A. Giray Yaglikci, Haocong Luo, Jeremie S. Kim, F. Nisa Bostanci, Nandita Vijaykumar, Oguz Ergin, and Onur Mutlu,
"QUAC-TRNG: High-Throughput True Random Number Generation Using Quadruple Row Activation in Commodity DRAM Chips"
Proceedings of the 48th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), Virtual, June 2021.
[[Slides \(pptx\)](#)] [[pdf](#)]
[[Short Talk Slides \(pptx\)](#)] [[pdf](#)]
[[Talk Video](#) (25 minutes)]
[[SAFARI Live Seminar Video](#) (1 hr 26 mins)]

QUAC-TRNG: High-Throughput True Random Number Generation Using Quadruple Row Activation in Commodity DRAM Chips

Ataberk Olgun^{§†} Minesh Patel[§] A. Giray Yağlıkçı[§] Haocong Luo[§]
Jeremie S. Kim[§] F. Nisa Bostancı^{§†} Nandita Vijaykumar^{§⊙} Oğuz Ergin[†] Onur Mutlu[§]
[§]ETH Zürich [†]TOBB University of Economics and Technology [⊙]University of Toronto

In-DRAM True Random Number Generation

- F. Nisa Bostanci, Ataberk Olgun, Lois Orosa, A. Giray Yaglikci, Jeremie S. Kim, Hasan Hassan, Oguz Ergin, and Onur Mutlu,

"DR-STRaNGe: End-to-End System Design for DRAM-based True Random Number Generators"

Proceedings of the 28th International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA), Virtual, April 2022.

[[Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[Short Talk Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

DR-STRaNGe: End-to-End System Design for DRAM-based True Random Number Generators

F. Nisa Bostanci^{†§}

Ataberk Olgun^{†§}

Lois Orosa[§]

A. Giray Yağlıkçı[§]

Jeremie S. Kim[§]

Hasan Hassan[§]

Oğuz Ergin[†]

Onur Mutlu[§]

[†]*TOBB University of Economics and Technology*

[§]*ETH Zürich*

In-Flash Bulk Bitwise Execution

- Jisung Park, Roknoddin Azizi, Geraldo F. Oliveira, Mohammad Sadrosadati, Rakesh Nadig, David Novo, Juan Gómez-Luna, Myungsuk Kim, and Onur Mutlu, **"Flash-Cosmos: In-Flash Bulk Bitwise Operations Using Inherent Computation Capability of NAND Flash Memory"**
Proceedings of the 55th International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO), Chicago, IL, USA, October 2022.
[[Slides \(pptx\)](#)] [[pdf](#)]
[[Longer Lecture Slides \(pptx\)](#)] [[pdf](#)]
[[Lecture Video](#) (44 minutes)]
[[arXiv version](#)]

Flash-Cosmos: In-Flash Bulk Bitwise Operations Using Inherent Computation Capability of NAND Flash Memory

Jisung Park^{§∇} Roknoddin Azizi[§] Geraldo F. Oliveira[§] Mohammad Sadrosadati[§]
Rakesh Nadig[§] David Novo[†] Juan Gómez-Luna[§] Myungsuk Kim[‡] Onur Mutlu[§]

[§]ETH Zürich [∇]POSTECH [†]LIRMM, Univ. Montpellier, CNRS [‡]Kyungpook National University

PIM Review and Open Problems

A Modern Primer on Processing in Memory

Onur Mutlu^{a,b}, Saugata Ghose^{b,c}, Juan Gómez-Luna^a, Rachata Ausavarungnirun^d

SAFARI Research Group

^a*ETH Zürich*

^b*Carnegie Mellon University*

^c*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

^d*King Mongkut's University of Technology North Bangkok*

Onur Mutlu, Saugata Ghose, Juan Gomez-Luna, and Rachata Ausavarungnirun,
"A Modern Primer on Processing in Memory"
*Invited Book Chapter in **Emerging Computing: From Devices to Systems - Looking Beyond Moore and Von Neumann**, Springer, to be published in 2021.*

How to Enable Adoption of Processing in Memory


Potential Barriers to Adoption of PIM

1. **Applications & software** for PIM
2. Ease of **programming** (interfaces and compiler/HW support)
3. **System** and **security** support: coherence, synchronization, virtual memory, isolation, communication interfaces, ...
4. **Runtime** and **compilation** systems for adaptive scheduling, data mapping, access/sharing control, ...
5. **Infrastructures** to assess benefits and feasibility

All can be solved with change of mindset

We Need to Revisit the Entire Stack

- With a **memory-centric mindset**



We can get there step by step

Potential Security Issues & Benefits (I)

■ **Can PIM worsen security?**

- ❑ Worsened or easier-to-induce physical issues (e.g., RowHammer)?
- ❑ Worsened or new side channels?
- ❑ Hardware bugs?
- ❑ New threat models?
- ❑ ...

■ **Can PIM enhance security?**

- ❑ Less exposure of data (& keys?)
- ❑ In-memory (homomorphic) encryption & cryptographic hashing
- ❑ Execution of security functions; trusted execution in memory
- ❑ Support for security primitives (TRNGs, PUFs, encryption, ...)
- ❑ More or better isolation, virtualization, containerization?
- ❑ ...

Potential Security Issues & Benefits (II)

■ Security analysis of PIM Systems

- ❑ Different types of PIM: PnM vs. PuM
- ❑ Different locations: cache, MC, DRAM, NVM, storage, remote, ...
- ❑ General-purpose vs. special-purpose PIM?
- ❑ Multi tenancy vs. single workload?
- ❑ Concurrent host and PIM access?
- ❑ Memory bus protection; memory wire(s) protection?
- ❑ Robustness issues like RowHammer, RowPress, ...
- ❑ ...

■ Can PIM support (more) secure execution of workloads?

- ❑ What is needed to do so?
- ❑ Secure PIM enclaves?
- ❑ ...

PIM Helps Security: Many Examples

Harshita Gupta, Mayank Kabra, Juan Gómez-Luna, Konstantinos Kanellopoulos, and Onur Mutlu,
"Evaluating Homomorphic Operations on a Real-World Processing-In-Memory System"
Proceedings of the 2023 IEEE International Symposium on Workload Characterization Poster
Session (IISWC), Ghent, Belgium, October 2023.

[[arXiv version](#)]

[[Lightning Talk Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

[[Poster \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]

Evaluating Homomorphic Operations on a Real-World Processing-In-Memory System

Harshita Gupta* Mayank Kabra* Juan Gómez-Luna Konstantinos Kanellopoulos Onur Mutlu
ETH Zürich

PIM Worsens Side Channels: An Example

Amplifying Main Memory-Based Timing Covert and Side Channels using Processing-in-Memory Operations

Konstantinos Kanellopoulos^{†*} F. Nisa Bostancı^{†*} Ataberk Olgun[†]
A. Giray Yağlıkçı[†] İsmail Emir Yüksel[†] Nika Mansouri Ghiasi[†]
Zülal Bingöl^{†‡} Mohammad Sadrosadati[†] Onur Mutlu[†]

[†]ETH Zürich [‡]Bilkent University

Concluding Remarks

Summary: Three Major Limiters

- Technology scaling is not going well
- System complexity is increasing; old methods not keeping up
- Processor-centric designs are not keeping up
- These affect all metrics we care about
- These have fundamental impact on security and how we build secure systems
- **We need to revisit how we build architectures and how we secure them**

Funding Acknowledgments

- Alibaba, AMD, ASML, Google, Facebook, Hi-Silicon, HP Labs, Huawei, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Nvidia, Oracle, Qualcomm, Rambus, Samsung, Seagate, VMware, Xilinx
- NSF
- NIH
- GSRC
- SRC
- CyLab
- EFCL
- SNSF

Thank you!

Acknowledgments

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<https://safari.ethz.ch>

SAFARI Newsletter June 2023 Edition

- <https://safari.ethz.ch/safari-newsletter-june-2023/>

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June 2023



SAFARI Newsletter July 2024 Edition

- <https://safari.ethz.ch/safari-newsletter-july-2024/>



Referenced Papers, Talks, Artifacts

- All are available at

<https://people.inf.ethz.ch/omutlu/projects.htm>

<https://www.youtube.com/onurmutlulectures>

<https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/>

Open Source Tools: SAFARI GitHub



SAFARI Research Group at ETH Zurich and Carnegie Mellon University

Site for source code and tools distribution from SAFARI Research Group at ETH Zurich and Carnegie Mellon University.

👤 440 followers

📍 ETH Zurich and Carnegie Mellon U...

🔗 <https://safari.ethz.ch/>

✉ omutlu@gmail.com

🏠 Overview

📁 Repositories 80

📁 Projects

📁 Packages

👤 People 13

📁 ramulator Public

A Fast and Extensible DRAM Simulator, with built-in support for modeling many different DRAM technologies including DDRx, LPDDRx, GDDRx, WIOx, HBMx, and various academic proposals. Described in the...

● C++ ☆ 558 🍴 207

📁 prim-benchmarks Public

PrIM (Processing-In-Memory benchmarks) is the first benchmark suite for a real-world processing-in-memory (PIM) architecture. PrIM is developed to evaluate, analyze, and characterize the first publ...

● C ☆ 131 🍴 48

📁 MQSim Public

MQSim is a fast and accurate simulator modeling the performance of modern multi-queue (MQ) SSDs as well as traditional SATA based SSDs. MQSim faithfully models new high-bandwidth protocol implement...

● C++ ☆ 271 🍴 149

📁 rowhammer Public

Source code for testing the Row Hammer error mechanism in DRAM devices. Described in the ISCA 2014 paper by Kim et al. at http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~omutlu/pub/dram-row-hammer_isca14.pdf.

● C ☆ 214 🍴 42

📁 SoftMC Public

SoftMC is an experimental FPGA-based memory controller design that can be used to develop tests for DDR3 SODIMMs using a C++ based API. The design, the interface, and its capabilities and limitatio...

● Verilog ☆ 122 🍴 28

📁 Pythia Public

A customizable hardware prefetching framework using online reinforcement learning as described in the MICRO 2021 paper by Bera et al. (<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2109.12021.pdf>).

● C++ ☆ 112 🍴 34

<https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/>

Future of Computer Architecture and Hardware Security

Onur Mutlu

omutlu@gmail.com

<https://people.inf.ethz.ch/omutlu>

10 September 2024

Microsoft Research


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Onur Mutlu's SAFARI Research Group

Computer architecture, HW/SW, systems, bioinformatics, security, memory

<https://safari.ethz.ch/safari-newsletter-january-2021/>



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SAFARI Newsletter December 2021 Edition

- <https://safari.ethz.ch/safari-newsletter-december-2021/>

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June 2023



SAFARI Introduction & Research

Computer architecture, HW/SW, systems, bioinformatics, security, memory



Seminar in Computer Architecture - Lecture 5: Potpourri of Research Topics (Spring 2023)



Onur Mutlu Lectures
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719 views Streamed 1 month ago Livestream - Seminar in Computer Architecture - ETH Zürich (Spring 2023)

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THINK BIG, AIM HIGH!

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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mV2OuB2djEs>

SAFARI PhD and Post-Doc Alumni

- <https://safari.ethz.ch/safari-alumni/>
- Hasan Hassan (Rivos), **EDAA Outstanding Dissertation Award 2023**; S&P 2020 Best Paper Award, 2020 Pwnie Award, IEEE Micro TP HM 2020
- Christina Giannoula (Univ. of Toronto), **NTUA Best Dissertation Award 2023**
- Minesh Patel (Rutgers, Asst. Prof.), **DSN Carter Award Best Thesis 2022**; ETH Medal 2023; MICRO'20 & DSN'20 Best Paper Awards; ISCA HoF 2021
- Damla Senol Cali (Bionano Genomics), **SRC TECHCON 2019 Best Student Presentation Award**; RECOMB-Seq 2018 Best Poster Award
- Nastaran Hajinazar (Intel)
- Gagandeep Singh (AMD/Xilinx), **FPL 2020 Best Paper Award Finalist**
- Amirali Boroumand (Stanford Univ → Google), **SRC TECHCON 2018 Best Presentation Award**
- Jeremie Kim (Apple), **EDAA Outstanding Dissertation Award 2020**; IEEE Micro Top Picks 2019; ISCA/MICRO HoF 2021
- Nandita Vijaykumar (Univ. of Toronto, Assistant Professor), **ISCA Hall of Fame 2021**
- Kevin Hsieh (Microsoft Research, Senior Researcher)
- Justin Meza (Facebook), **HiPEAC 2015 Best Student Presentation Award**; ICCD 2012 Best Paper Award
- Mohammed Alser (ETH Zurich), **IEEE Turkey Best PhD Thesis Award 2018**
- Yixin Luo (Google), **HPCA 2015 Best Paper Session**
- Kevin Chang (Facebook), **SRC TECHCON 2016 Best Student Presentation Award**
- Rachata Ausavarungnirun (KMUNTB, Assistant Professor), **NOCS 2015 and NOCS 2012 Best Paper Award Finalist**
- Gennady Pekhimenko (Univ. of Toronto, Assistant Professor), **ISCA Hall of Fame 2021**; ASPLOS 2015 SRC Winner
- Vivek Seshadri (Microsoft Research)
- Donghyuk Lee (NVIDIA Research, Senior Researcher), **HPCA Hall of Fame 2018**
- Yoongu Kim (Software Robotics → Google), **TCAD'19 Top Pick Award**; IEEE Micro Top Picks'10; HPCA'10 Best Paper Session
- Lavanya Subramanian (Intel Labs → Facebook)

- Samira Khan (Univ. of Virginia, Assistant Professor), **HPCA 2014 Best Paper Session**
- Saugata Ghose (Univ. of Illinois, Assistant Professor), **DFRWS-EU 2017 Best Paper Award**
- Jawad Haj-Yahya (Huawei Research Zurich, Principal Researcher)
- Lois Orosa (Galicia Supercomputing Center, Director)
- Jisung Park (POSTECH, Assistant Professor)
- Gagandeep Singh (AMD/Xilinx, Researcher)
- Juan Gomez-Luna (NVIDIA, Researcher), **ISPASS 2023 Best Paper Session**

Processing in Memory: Evaluation Methods

Simulators (Open Source)

- Ramulator 2.0 & Ramulator-PIM
- DAMOVSim
- UPMEMSim (UPMEM)
- AiMSim (SK Hynix)
- ...

Ramulator + Gem5

- Haocong Luo, Yahya Can Tugrul, F. Nisa Bostanci, Ataberk Olgun, A. Giray Yaglikci, and Onur Mutlu,
"Ramulator 2.0: A Modern, Modular, and Extensible DRAM Simulator"
*Preprint on **arxiv**, August 2023.*
[[arXiv version](#)]
[[Ramulator 2.0 Source Code](#)]

Ramulator 2.0: A Modern, Modular, and Extensible DRAM Simulator


Haocong Luo, Yahya Can Tuğrul, F. Nisa Bostancı, Ataberk Olgun, A. Giray Yağlıkçı, and Onur Mutlu

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2308.11030.pdf>

Opportunity: 3D-Stacked Logic+Memory



Hybrid Memory Cube
C O N S O R T I U M




Memory

Logic


Other "True 3D" technologies
under development

Tesseract System for Graph Processing


Interconnected set of 3D-stacked memory+logic chips with simple cores



Tesseract System for Graph Processing




Tesseract System for Graph Processing




Simulated Systems

DDR3-OoO




102.4GB/s

HMC-OoO




640GB/s

HMC-MC



640GB/s


Tesseract




8TB/s

Tesseract Graph Processing Performance

>13X Performance Improvement



Tesseract Graph Processing System Energy



More on Tesseract

- Junwhan Ahn, Sungpack Hong, Sungjoo Yoo, Onur Mutlu, and Kiyoun Choi,
"A Scalable Processing-in-Memory Accelerator for Parallel Graph Processing"
Proceedings of the 42nd International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), Portland, OR, June 2015.
[Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Lightning Session Slides (pptx) (pdf)]
Top Picks Honorable Mention by IEEE Micro.
Selected to the ISCA-50 25-Year Retrospective Issue covering 1996-2020 in 2023 (Retrospective (pdf) Full Issue).

A Scalable Processing-in-Memory Accelerator for Parallel Graph Processing

Junwhan Ahn Sungpack Hong[§] Sungjoo Yoo Onur Mutlu[†] Kiyoun Choi
junwhan@snu.ac.kr, sungpack.hong@oracle.com, sungjoo.yoo@gmail.com, onur@cmu.edu, kchoi@snu.ac.kr


Seoul National University

[§]Oracle Labs



[†]Carnegie Mellon University

Processing-in-Memory in the Real World


Processing-in-Memory Landscape Today




[Samsung 2021]




[Alibaba 2022]



[SK Hynix 2022]



[Samsung 2021]



[UPMEM 2019]

Processing-in-Memory Landscape Today

IEEE COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE LETTERS, VOL. 22, NO. 1, JANUARY-JUNE

Computational CXL-Memory Solution for Accelerating Memory-Intensive Applications

Joonseop Sim^{ID}, Soohong Ahn^{ID}, Taeyoung Ahn^{ID},
Seungyong Lee^{ID}, Myunghyun Rhee, Jooyoung Kim^{ID},
Kwangsik Shin, Donguk Moon^{ID},
Euseok Kim, and Kyoung Park^{ID}

Abstract—CXL interface is the up-to-date technology that enables effective memory expansion by providing a memory-sharing protocol in configuring heterogeneous devices. However, its limited physical bandwidth can be a significant bottleneck for emerging data-intensive applications. In this work, we propose a novel CXL-based memory disaggregation architecture with a real-world prototype demonstration, which overcomes the bandwidth limitation of the CXL interface using near-data processing. The experimental results demonstrate that our design achieves up to $1.9\times$ better performance/power efficiency than the existing CPU system.

Index Terms—Compute express link (CXL), near-data-processing (NDP)




Fig. 6. FPGA prototype of proposed CMS card.

Processing-in-Memory Landscape Today

Samsung Processing in Memory Technology at Hot Chips 2023


By **Patrick Kennedy** - August 28, 2023




Samsung PIM PNM For Transformer Based AI HC35_Page_24

Samsung AxDIMM (2021)



- DDRx-PIM
 - DLRM recommendation system



Baseline System



AxDIMM System



Samsung Function-in-Memory DRAM (2021)



Samsung Develops Industry's First High Bandwidth Memory with AI Processing Power

Korea on February 17, 2021

Audio



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
The new architecture will deliver over twice the system performance and reduce energy consumption by more than 70%

Samsung Electronics, the world leader in advanced memory technology, today announced that it has developed the industry's first High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) integrated with artificial intelligence (AI) processing power – the HBM-PIM. The new processing-in-memory (PIM) architecture brings powerful AI computing capabilities inside high-performance memory, to accelerate large-scale processing in data centers, high performance computing (HPC) systems and AI-enabled mobile applications.

Kwangil Park, senior vice president of Memory Product Planning at Samsung Electronics stated, "Our groundbreaking HBM-PIM is the industry's first programmable PIM solution tailored for diverse AI-driven workloads such as HPC, training and inference. We plan to build upon this breakthrough by further collaborating with AI solution providers for even more advanced PIM-powered applications."

Samsung Function-in-Memory DRAM (2021)

■ FIMDRAM based on HBM2



[3D Chip Structure of HBM with FIMDRAM]

Chip Specification

128DQ / 8CH / 16 banks / BL4

32 PCU blocks (1 FIM block/2 banks)

1.2 TFLOPS (4H)

**FP16 ADD /
Multiply (MUL) /
Multiply-Accumulate (MAC) /
Multiply-and- Add (MAD)**

ISSCC 2021 / SESSION 25 / DRAM / 25.4

25.4 A 20nm 6GB Function-In-Memory DRAM, Based on HBM2 with a 1.2TFLOPS Programmable Computing Unit Using Bank-Level Parallelism, for Machine Learning Applications

Young-Cheon Kwon¹, Suk Han Lee¹, Jaehoon Lee¹, Sang-Hyuk Kwon¹, Je Min Ryu¹, Jong-Pil Son¹, Seongil O¹, Hak-Soo Yu¹, Haesuk Lee¹, Soo Young Kim¹, Youngmin Cho¹, Jin Guk Kim¹, Jongyoon Choi¹, Hyun-Sung Shin¹, Jin Kim¹, BengSeng Phuah¹, HyoungMin Kim¹, Myeong Jun Song¹, Ahn Choi¹, Daeho Kim¹, SooYoung Kim¹, Eun-Bong Kim¹, David Wang², Shinhaeng Kang¹, Yuhwan Ro³, Seungwoo Seo³, JoonHo Song³, Jaeyoun Youn¹, Kyomin Sohn¹, Nam Sung Kim¹

¹Samsung Electronics, Hwaseong, Korea

²Samsung Electronics, San Jose, CA


³Samsung Electronics, Suwon, Korea

Samsung Function-in-Memory DRAM (2021)

Programmable Computing Unit

■ Configuration of PCU block

- Interface unit to control data flow
- Execution unit to perform operations
- Register group
 - 32 entries of CRF for instruction memory
 - 16 GRF for weight and accumulation
 - 16 SRF to store constants for MAC operations



[Block diagram of PCU in FIMDRAM]

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25.4 A 20nm 6Gb Function-in-Memory DRAM, Based on HBM2 with a 1.2TFLOPS Programmable Computing Unit Using Bank-Level Parallelism, for Machine Learning Applications

Young-Cheon Kwon¹, Suk Han Lee¹, Jaehoon Lee¹, Sang-Hyuk Kwon¹, Je Min Ryu¹, Jong-Pil Son¹, Seongil O¹, Hak-Soo Yu¹, Haesuk Lee¹, Soo Young Kim¹, Youngmin Cho¹, Jin Guk Kim¹, Jongyoon Choi¹, Hyun-Sung Shin¹, Jin Kim¹, BengSeng Phuah¹, HyungMin Kim¹, Myeong Jun Song¹, Ahn Choi¹, Daeho Kim¹, SooYoung Kim¹, Eun-Bong Kim¹, David Wang¹, Shinhaeng Kang¹, Yuhwan Ro¹, Seungwoo Seo¹, JoonHo Song¹, Jaeyoun Youn¹, Kyomin Sohn¹, Nam Sung Kim¹

¹Samsung Electronics, Hwaseong, Korea
²Samsung Electronics, San Jose, CA
³Samsung Electronics, Suwon, Korea

Samsung Function-in-Memory DRAM (2021)

[Available instruction list for FIM operation]

Type	CMD	Description
Floating Point	ADD	FP16 addition
	MUL	FP16 multiplication
	MAC	FP16 multiply-accumulate
	MAD	FP16 multiply and add
Data Path	MOVE	Load or store data
	FILL	Copy data from bank to GRFs
Control Path	NOP	Do nothing
	JUMP	Jump instruction
	EXIT	Exit instruction

ISSCC 2021 / SESSION 25 / DRAM / 25.4

25.4 A 20nm 6GB Function-in-Memory DRAM, Based on HBM2 with a 1.2TFLOPS Programmable Computing Unit Using Bank-Level Parallelism, for Machine Learning Applications

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¹Samsung Electronics, Hwaseong, Korea


²Samsung Electronics, San Jose, CA

³Samsung Electronics, Suwon, Korea


Samsung Function-in-Memory DRAM (2021)

Chip Implementation

- Mixed design methodology to implement FIMDRAM
 - Full-custom + Digital RTL



[Digital RTL design for PCU block]



ISSCC 2021 / SESSION 25 / DRAM / 25.4

25.4 A 20nm 6GB Function-In-Memory DRAM, Based on HBM2 with a 1.2TFLOPS Programmable Computing Unit Using Bank-Level Parallelism, for Machine Learning Applications

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¹Samsung Electronics, Hwaseong, Korea
²Samsung Electronics, San Jose, CA
³Samsung Electronics, Suwon, Korea

SK Hynix Accelerator-in-Memory (2022)

SK hynix Develops PIM, Next-Generation AI Accelerator

February 16, 2022



Seoul, February 16, 2022

SK hynix (or “the Company”, www.skhynix.com) announced on February 16 that it has developed PIM*, a next-generation memory chip with computing capabilities.


**PIM(Processing In Memory): A next-generation technology that provides a solution for data congestion issues for AI and big data by adding computational functions to semiconductor memory*

It has been generally accepted that memory chips store data and CPU or GPU, like human brain, process data. SK hynix, following its challenge to such notion and efforts to pursue innovation in the next-generation smart memory, has found a breakthrough solution with the development of the latest technology.

SK hynix plans to showcase its PIM development at the world’s most prestigious semiconductor conference, 2022 ISSCC*, in San Francisco at the end of this month. The company expects continued efforts for innovation of this technology to bring the memory-centric computing, in which semiconductor memory plays a central role, a step closer to the reality in devices such as smartphones.

**ISSCC: The International Solid-State Circuits Conference will be held virtually from Feb. 20 to Feb. 24 this year with a theme of “Intelligent Silicon for a Sustainable World”*

For the first product that adopts the PIM technology, SK hynix has developed a sample of GDDR6-AiM (Accelerator* in memory). The GDDR6-AiM adds computational functions to GDDR6* memory chips, which process data at 16Gbps. A combination of GDDR6-AiM with CPU or GPU instead of a typical DRAM makes certain computation speed 16 times faster. GDDR6-AiM is widely expected to be adopted for machine learning, high-performance computing, and big data computation and storage.



11.1 A 1nm 1.25V 8Gb, 16Gb/s/pin GDDR6-based Accelerator-in-Memory supporting 1TFLOPS MAC Operation and Various Activation Functions for Deep-Learning Applications

Seongju Lee, SK hynix, Icheon, Korea

In Paper 11.1, SK Hynix describes an 1nm, GDDR6-based accelerator-in-memory with a command set for deep-learning operation. The 8Gb design achieves a peak throughput of 1TFLOPS with 1GHz MAC operations and supports major activation functions to improve accuracy.

SK Hynix Accelerator-in-Memory (2022)

System Architecture and Software Stack for GDDR6-AiM

Yongkee Kwon and Chanwook Park
SK hynix inc.

5:42 / 6:27:38

SK hynix

ASPLOS 2023 Tutorial: Real-world Processing-in-Memory Systems for Modern Workloads



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ASPLOS 2023 Tutorial: Real-world Processing-in-Memory Systems for Modern Workloads

<https://events.safari.ethz.ch/asplos-...>

AliBaba PIM Recommendation System (2022)

ISSCC 2022 / February 24, 2022 / 8:30 AM




Figure 29.1.2: Illustration of 3D-stacked chip, cross-illustration of package, DRAM array layout and design blocks on logic die.






Figure 29.1.7: Die micrographs of DRAM die, NE and ME. Detailed specifications of DRAM die and logic die.

29.1 184QPS/W 64Mb/mm² 3D Logic-to-DRAM Hybrid Bonding with Process-Near-Memory Engine for Recommendation System

Dimin Niu¹, Shuangchen Li¹, Yuhao Wang¹, Wei Han¹, Zhe Zhang², Yijin Guan², Tianchan Guan³, Fei Sun¹, Fei Xue¹, Lide Duan¹, Yuanwei Fang¹, Hongzhong Zheng¹, Xiping Jiang⁴, Song Wang⁴, Fengguo Zuo⁴, Yubing Wang⁴, Bing Yu⁴, Qiwei Ren⁴, Yuan Xie¹


UPMEM Processing-in-DRAM Engine (2019)

- **Processing in DRAM Engine**
- Includes **standard DIMM modules**, with a **large number of DPU processors** combined with DRAM chips.
- Replaces **standard DIMMs**
 - DDR4 R-DIMM modules
 - 8GB+128 DPUs (16 PIM chips)
 - Standard 2x-nm DRAM process
 - **Large amounts of** compute & memory bandwidth




UPMEM Memory Modules

- E19: 8 chips DIMM (1 rank). DPUs @ 267 MHz
- P21: 16 chips DIMM (2 ranks). DPUs @ 350 MHz



2,560-DPU Processing-in-Memory System



Benchmarking a New Paradigm: An Experimental Analysis of a Real Processing-in-Memory Architecture

JUAN GÓMEZ-LUNA, ETH Zürich, Switzerland
 IZZAT EL HAJJ, American University of Beirut, Lebanon
 IVAN FERNANDEZ, ETH Zürich, Switzerland and University of Malaga, Spain
 CHRISTINA GIANNOULA, ETH Zürich, Switzerland and NTUA, Greece
 GERALDO F. OLIVEIRA, ETH Zürich, Switzerland
 ONUR MUTLU, ETH Zürich, Switzerland

Many modern workloads, such as neural networks, databases, and graph processing, are fundamentally memory-bound. For such workloads, the data movement between main memory and CPU cores imposes a significant overhead in terms of both latency and energy. A major reason is that this communication happens through a narrow bus with high latency and limited bandwidth, and the low data reuse in memory-bound workloads is insufficient to amortize the cost of main memory access. Fundamentally addressing this *data movement bottleneck* requires a paradigm where the memory system assumes an active role in computing by integrating processing capabilities. This paradigm is known as *processing-in-memory (PIM)*.


Recent research explores different forms of PIM architectures, motivated by the emergence of new 3D-stacked memory technologies that integrate memory with a logic layer where processing elements can be easily placed. Past works evaluate these architectures in simulation or, at best, with simplified hardware prototypes. In contrast, the UPMEM company has designed and manufactured the first publicly-available real-world PIM architecture. The UPMEM PIM architecture combines traditional DRAM memory arrays with general-purpose in-order cores, called *DRAM Processing Units (DPUs)*, integrated in the same chip.

This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of the first publicly-available real-world PIM architecture. We make two key contributions. First, we conduct an experimental characterization of the UPMEM-based PIM system using microbenchmarks to assess various architecture limits such as compute throughput and memory bandwidth, yielding new insights. Second, we present *PrIM (Processing-In-Memory benchmarks)*, a benchmark suite of 16 workloads from different application domains (e.g., dense/sparse linear algebra, databases, data analytics, graph processing, neural networks, bioinformatics, image processing), which we identify as memory-bound. We evaluate the performance and scaling characteristics of PrIM benchmarks on the UPMEM PIM architecture, and compare their performance and energy consumption to their state-of-the-art CPU and GPU counterparts. Our extensive evaluation conducted on two real UPMEM-based PIM systems with 640 and 2,560 DPUs provides new insights about suitability of different workloads to the PIM system, programming recommendations for software designers, and suggestions and hints for hardware and architecture designers of future PIM systems.



<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.03814.pdf>

More on the UPMEM PIM System



ETH ZÜRICH HAUPTGEBÄUDE

Computer Architecture - Lecture 12d: Real Processing-in-DRAM with UPMEM (ETH Zürich, Fall 2020)

1,120 views • Oct 31, 2020

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Onur Mutlu Lectures
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ANALYTICS

EDIT VIDEO

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sscy1Wrr22A&list=PL5Q2soXY2Zi9xidyIgBxUz7xRPS-wisBN&index=26>

Experimental Analysis of the UPMEM PIM Engine

Benchmarking a New Paradigm: An Experimental Analysis of a Real Processing-in-Memory Architecture

JUAN GÓMEZ-LUNA, ETH Zürich, Switzerland

IZZAT EL HAJJ, American University of Beirut, Lebanon

IVAN FERNANDEZ, ETH Zürich, Switzerland and University of Malaga, Spain

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ONUR MUTLU, ETH Zürich, Switzerland

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UPMEM PIM System Summary & Analysis

- Juan Gomez-Luna, Izzat El Hajj, Ivan Fernandez, Christina Giannoula, Geraldo F. Oliveira, and Onur Mutlu,
"Benchmarking Memory-Centric Computing Systems: Analysis of Real Processing-in-Memory Hardware"
*Invited Paper at Workshop on Computing with Unconventional Technologies (**CUT**), Virtual, October 2021.*
[[arXiv version](#)]
[[PrIM Benchmarks Source Code](#)]
[[Slides \(pptx\)](#) ([pdf](#))]
[[Talk Video](#) (37 minutes)]
[[Lightning Talk Video](#) (3 minutes)]

Benchmarking Memory-Centric Computing Systems: Analysis of Real Processing-in-Memory Hardware


Juan Gómez-Luna	Izzat El Hajj	Ivan Fernandez	Christina Giannoula	Geraldo F. Oliveira	Onur Mutlu
<i>ETH Zürich</i>	<i>American University of Beirut</i>	<i>University of Malaga</i>	<i>National Technical University of Athens</i>	<i>ETH Zürich</i>	<i>ETH Zürich</i>

PrIM Benchmarks: Application Domains

Domain	Benchmark	Short name
Dense linear algebra	Vector Addition	VA
	Matrix-Vector Multiply	GEMV
Sparse linear algebra	Sparse Matrix-Vector Multiply	SpMV
Databases	Select	SEL
	Unique	UNI
Data analytics	Binary Search	BS
	Time Series Analysis	TS
Graph processing	Breadth-First Search	BFS
Neural networks	Multilayer Perceptron	MLP
Bioinformatics	Needleman-Wunsch	NW
Image processing	Image histogram (short)	HST-S
	Image histogram (large)	HST-L
Parallel primitives	Reduction	RED
	Prefix sum (scan-scan-add)	SCAN-SSA
	Prefix sum (reduce-scan-scan)	SCAN-RSS
	Matrix transposition	TRNS

PrIM Benchmarks are Open Source

- All microbenchmarks, benchmarks, and scripts
- <https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/prim-benchmarks>



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main prim-benchmarks / README.md Go to file ...

Juan Gomez Luna PrIM -- first commit Latest commit 3de4b49 9 days ago History

1 contributor

168 lines (132 sloc) 5.79 KB Raw Blame

PrIM (Processing-In-Memory Benchmarks)

PrIM is the first benchmark suite for a real-world processing-in-memory (PIM) architecture. PrIM is developed to evaluate, analyze, and characterize the first publicly-available real-world processing-in-memory (PIM) architecture, the [UPMEM](#) PIM architecture. The UPMEM PIM architecture combines traditional DRAM memory arrays with general-purpose in-order cores, called DRAM Processing Units (DPUs), integrated in the same chip.

PrIM provides a common set of workloads to evaluate the UPMEM PIM architecture with and can be useful for programming, architecture and system researchers all alike to improve multiple aspects of future PIM hardware and software. The workloads have different characteristics, exhibiting heterogeneity in their memory access patterns, operations and data types, and communication patterns. This repository also contains baseline CPU and GPU implementations of PrIM benchmarks for comparison purposes.

PrIM also includes a set of microbenchmarks can be used to assess various architecture limits such as compute throughput and memory bandwidth.

Understanding a Modern PIM Architecture

Benchmarking a New Paradigm: Experimental Analysis and Characterization of a Real Processing-in-Memory System

**JUAN GÓMEZ-LUNA¹, IZZAT EL HAJJ², IVAN FERNANDEZ^{1,3}, CHRISTINA GIANNOULA^{1,4},
GERALDO F. OLIVEIRA¹, AND ONUR MUTLU¹**

¹ETH Zürich

²American University of Beirut

³University of Malaga

⁴National Technical University of Athens

Corresponding author: Juan Gómez-Luna (e-mail: juang@ethz.ch).

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.03814.pdf>

<https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/prim-benchmarks>

Real Processing Using Memory Prototype

- End-to-end RowClone & TRNG using off-the-shelf DRAM chips
- Idea: Violate DRAM timing parameters to mimic RowClone

PiDRAM: A Holistic End-to-end FPGA-based Framework for Processing-in-DRAM

Ataberk Olgun^{§†}

Juan Gómez Luna[§]
Hasan Hassan[§]

Konstantinos Kanellopoulos[§]
Oğuz Ergin[†] Onur Mutlu[§]

Behzad Salami^{§*}

[§]ETH Zürich

[†]TOBB ETÜ


^{*}BSC

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.00082.pdf>

<https://github.com/cmu-safari/pidram>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeukNs5XI3g&t=4192s>

Real Processing Using Memory Prototype



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<https://github.com/cmu-safari/pidram>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeukNs5XI3g&t=4192s>

Real Processing Using Memory Prototype

☰ README.md

Building a PiDRAM Prototype

To build PiDRAM's prototype on Xilinx ZC706 boards, developers need to use the two sub-projects in this directory. `fpga-zynq` is a repository branched off of [UCB-BAR's fpga-zynq](#) repository. We use `fpga-zynq` to generate rocket chip designs that support end-to-end DRAM PuM execution. `controller-hardware` is where we keep the main Vivado project and Verilog sources for PiDRAM's memory controller and the top level system design.

Rebuilding Steps

1. Navigate into `fpga-zynq` and read the README file to understand the overall workflow of the repository
 - Follow the readme in `fpga-zynq/rocket-chip/riscv-tools` to install dependencies
2. Create the Verilog source of the rocket chip design using the `ZynqCopyFPGAConfig`
 - Navigate into `zc706`, then run `make rocket CONFIG=ZynqCopyFPGAConfig -j<number of cores>`
3. Copy the generated Verilog file (should be under `zc706/src`) and overwrite the same file in `controller-hardware/source/hdl/impl/rocket-chip`
4. Open the Vivado project in `controller-hardware/Vivado_Project` using Vivado 2016.2
5. Generate a bitstream
6. Copy the bitstream (`system_top.bit`) to `fpga-zynq/zc706`
7. Use the `./build_script.sh` to generate the new `boot.bin` under `fpga-images-zc706`, you can use this file to program the FPGA using the SD-Card
 - For details, follow the relevant instructions in `fpga-zynq/README.md`

You can run programs compiled with the RISC-V Toolchain supplied within the `fpga-zynq` repository. To install the toolchain, follow the instructions under `fpga-zynq/rocket-chip/riscv-tools`.

Generating DDR3 Controller IP sources

We cannot provide the sources for the Xilinx PHY IP we use in PiDRAM's memory controller due to licensing issues. We describe here how to regenerate them using Vivado 2016.2. First, you need to generate the IP RTL files:


- 1- Open IP Catalog
- 2- Find "Memory Interface Generator (MIG 7 Series)" IP and double click

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.00082.pdf>

<https://github.com/cmu-safari/pidram>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeukNs5XI3g&t=4192s>

Microbenchmark Copy/Initialization Throughput



**In-DRAM Copy and Initialization
improve throughput by 119x and 89x**

More on PiDRAM

- Ataberk Olgun, Juan Gomez Luna, Konstantinos Kanellopoulos, Behzad Salami, Hasan Hassan, Oguz Ergin, and Onur Mutlu,
["PiDRAM: A Holistic End-to-end FPGA-based Framework for Processing-in-DRAM"](#)
[ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization \(TACO\)](#), March 2023.
[\[arXiv version\]](#)
Presented at the [18th HiPEAC Conference](#), Toulouse, France, January 2023.
[\[Slides \(pptx\) \(pdf\)\]](#)
[\[Longer Lecture Slides \(pptx\) \(pdf\)\]](#)
[\[Lecture Video \(40 minutes\)\]](#)
[\[PiDRAM Source Code\]](#)

PiDRAM: A Holistic End-to-end FPGA-based Framework for Processing-in-DRAM

Ataberk Olgun[§] Juan Gómez Luna[§] Konstantinos Kanellopoulos[§] Behzad Salami[§]
Hasan Hassan[§] Oğuz Ergin[†] Onur Mutlu[§]

[§]ETH Zürich

[†]TOBB University of Economics and Technology

More Security Implications (I)

“We can gain unrestricted access to systems of website visitors.”

www.iaik.tugraz.at ■

Not there yet, but ...



ROOT privileges for web apps!

29

Daniel Gruss (@lavados), Clémentine Maurice (@BloodyTangerine),
December 28, 2015 — 32c3, Hamburg, Germany



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COMMUNITIES

Rowhammer.js: A Remote Software-Induced Fault Attack in JavaScript (DIMVA'16)

More Security Implications (II)

"Can gain control of a smart phone deterministically"



Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer
Attacks on Mobile Platforms, CCS'16²³⁹

More Security Implications (III)

- Using an integrated GPU in a mobile system to remotely escalate privilege via the WebGL interface. [IEEE S&P 2018](#)



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"GRAND PWINING UNIT" —

Drive-by Rowhammer attack uses GPU to compromise an Android phone

JavaScript based GLitch pwns browsers by flipping bits inside memory chips.

DAN GOODIN - 5/3/2018, 12:00 PM

Grand Pwning Unit: Accelerating Microarchitectural Attacks with the GPU

Pietro Frigo
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam
p.frigo@vu.nl

Cristiano Giuffrida
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam
giuffrida@cs.vu.nl

Herbert Bos
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam
herbertb@cs.vu.nl

Kaveh Razavi
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam
kaveh@cs.vu.nl

More Security Implications (IV)

- Rowhammer over RDMA (I) [USENIX ATC 2018](#)

 TECHNICA

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THROWHAMMER —

Packets over a LAN are all it takes to trigger serious Rowhammer bit flips

The bar for exploiting potentially serious DDR weakness keeps getting lower.

DAN GOODIN - 5/10/2018, 5:26 PM

Throwhammer: Rowhammer Attacks over the Network and Defenses

Andrei Tatar
VU Amsterdam

Radhesh Krishnan
VU Amsterdam

Elias Athanasopoulos
University of Cyprus

Cristiano Giuffrida
VU Amsterdam

Herbert Bos
VU Amsterdam

Kaveh Razavi
VU Amsterdam

More Security Implications (V)

■ Rowhammer over RDMA (II)



Nethammer—Exploiting DRAM Rowhammer Bug Through Network Requests



Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults through Network Requests

Moritz Lipp
Graz University of Technology

Misiker Tadesse Aga
University of Michigan

Michael Schwarz
Graz University of Technology

Daniel Gruss
Graz University of Technology


Clémentine Maurice
Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA

Lukas Raab
Graz University of Technology

Lukas Lamster
Graz University of Technology

More Security Implications (VI)

- IEEE S&P 2020



RAMBleed

RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them

Andrew Kwong
University of Michigan
ankwong@umich.edu

Daniel Genkin
University of Michigan
genkin@umich.edu

Daniel Gruss
Graz University of Technology
daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at

Yuval Yarom
University of Adelaide and Data61
yval@cs.adelaide.edu.au

More Security Implications (VII)

■ USENIX Security 2019

Terminal Brain Damage: Exposing the Graceless Degradation in Deep Neural Networks Under Hardware Fault Attacks

Sanghyun Hong, Pietro Frigo[†], Yiğitcan Kaya, Cristiano Giuffrida[†], Tudor Dumitraş

University of Maryland, College Park

[†]Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam



A Single Bit-flip Can Cause Terminal Brain Damage to DNNs

One specific bit-flip in a DNN's representation leads to accuracy drop over 90%

Our research found that a specific bit-flip in a DNN's bitwise representation can cause the accuracy loss up to 90%, and the DNN has 40-50% parameters, on average, that can lead to the accuracy drop over 10% when individually subjected to such single bitwise corruptions...

[Read More](#)

More Security Implications (VIII)

■ USENIX Security 2020

DeepHammer: Depleting the Intelligence of Deep Neural Networks through Targeted Chain of Bit Flips

Fan Yao

University of Central Florida

fan.yao@ucf.edu

Adnan Siraj Rakin

Arizona State University

asrakin@asu.edu

Deliang Fan


Arizona State University

dfan@asu.edu

Degrade the inference accuracy to the level of Random Guess

Example: ResNet-20 for CIFAR-10, 10 output classes

Before attack, **Accuracy: 90.2%** After attack, **Accuracy: ~10% (1/10)**



Google's Half-Double RowHammer Attack (May 2021)

Google Security Blog

The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet

Introducing Half-Double: New hammering technique for DRAM Rowhammer bug

May 25, 2021

Research Team: Salman Qazi, Yoongu Kim, Nicolas Boichat, Eric Shiu & Mattias Nissler

Today, we are sharing details around our discovery of [Half-Double](#), a new Rowhammer technique that capitalizes on the worsening physics of some of the newer DRAM chips to alter the contents of memory.

Rowhammer is a DRAM vulnerability whereby repeated accesses to one address can tamper with the data stored at other addresses. Much like speculative execution vulnerabilities in CPUs, Rowhammer is a breach of the security guarantees made by the underlying hardware. As an electrical coupling phenomenon within the silicon itself, Rowhammer allows the potential bypass of hardware and software memory protection policies. This can allow untrusted code to break out of its sandbox and take full control of the system.

More Security Implications (VIII)

- **USENIX Security 2022**
- **Google's Half-Double RowHammer Attack**

Google Security Blog

The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet

Introducing Half-Double: New hammering technique for DRAM Rowhammer bug

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Half-Double: Hammering From the Next Row Over

Andreas Kogler¹ Jonas Juffinger^{1,2} Salman Qazi³ Yoongu Kim³ Moritz Lipp^{4*}
Nicolas Boichat³ Eric Shiu⁵ Mattias Nissler³ Daniel Gruss¹

¹*Graz University of Technology* ²*Lamarr Security Research* ³*Google*
⁴*Amazon Web Services* ⁵*Rivos*

More Security Implications?



A RowHammer Survey Across the Stack

- Onur Mutlu and Jeremie Kim,
[**"RowHammer: A Retrospective"**](#)
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems (TCAD) Special Issue on Top Picks in Hardware and Embedded Security, 2019.
[[Preliminary arXiv version](#)]
[[Slides from COSADE 2019 \(pptx\)](#)]
[[Slides from VLSI-SOC 2020 \(pptx\) \(pdf\)](#)]
[[Talk Video](#) (1 hr 15 minutes, with Q&A)]

RowHammer: A Retrospective

Onur Mutlu^{§‡} Jeremie S. Kim^{‡§}
[§]ETH Zürich [‡]Carnegie Mellon University

A RowHammer Survey: Recent Update

- Onur Mutlu, Ataberk Olgun, and A. Giray Yaglikci,
"Fundamentally Understanding and Solving RowHammer"
Invited Special Session Paper at the 28th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), Tokyo, Japan, January 2023.
[arXiv version]
[Slides (pptx) (pdf)]
[Talk Video (26 minutes)]

Fundamentally Understanding and Solving RowHammer

Onur Mutlu
onur.mutlu@safari.ethz.ch
ETH Zürich
Zürich, Switzerland


Ataberk Olgun
ataberk.olgund@safari.ethz.ch
ETH Zürich
Zürich, Switzerland

A. Giray Yağlıkçı
giray.yaglikci@safari.ethz.ch
ETH Zürich
Zürich, Switzerland

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2211.07613.pdf>

Main Memory Needs
Intelligent Controllers
for Security, Safety,
Reliability, Scaling

Aside: Intelligent Controller for NAND Flash



[DATE 2012, ICCD 2012, DATE 2013, ITJ 2013, ICCD 2013, SIGMETRICS 2014, HPCA 2015, DSN 2015, MSST 2015, JSAC 2016, HPCA 2017, DFRWS 2017, PIEEE 2017, HPCA 2018, SIGMETRICS 2018]

Cai+, "Error Characterization, Mitigation, and Recovery in Flash Memory Based Solid State Drives," Proc. IEEE 2017.



Proceedings of the IEEE, Sept. 2017



Error Characterization, Mitigation, and Recovery in Flash-Memory-Based Solid-State Drives

This paper reviews the most recent advances in solid-state drive (SSD) error characterization, mitigation, and data recovery techniques to improve both SSD's reliability and lifetime.

By YU CAI, SAUGATA GHOSE, ERICH F. HARATSCH, YIXIN LUO, AND ONUR MUTLU

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.08642>

Two Major RowHammer Directions

■ **Understanding RowHammer**

- Many effects still need to be rigorously examined
 - Aging of DRAM Chips
 - Environmental Conditions (e.g., Process, Voltage, Temperature)
 - Memory Access Patterns
 - Memory Controller & System Design Decisions
 - ...


■ **Solving RowHammer**

- Flexible and efficient solutions are necessary
 - In-field patchable / reconfigurable / programmable solutions
- Co-architecting System and Memory is important
 - To avoid performance and denial-of-service problems

RowHammer Becomes Worse with Aging

Preliminary data on aging via 68-day of continuous hammering

Aging can lead to read disturbance bitflips at **smaller** hammer counts



RowHammer Spatial Variation Analysis (2024)

- **Appears at HPCA 2024**

Spatial Variation-Aware Read Disturbance Defenses: Experimental Analysis of Real DRAM Chips and Implications on Future Solutions

Abdullah Giray Yağlıkçı Yahya Can Tuğrul Geraldo F. Oliveira
İsmail Emir Yüksel Ataberk Olgun Haocong Luo Onur Mutlu
ETH Zürich

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.18652>

Two Major Directions

- **Understanding Bitflips (Hardware errors in general)**
 - Many effects on bitflips still need to be rigorously examined
 - Aging of DRAM Chips
 - Environmental Conditions (e.g., Process, Voltage, Temperature)
 - Memory Access Patterns
 - Memory Controller & System Design Decisions
 - ...

- **Solving Bitflips (Hardware errors in general)**
 - Flexible and efficient solutions are necessary
 - In-field patchable / reconfigurable / programmable solutions
 - Co-architecting across the system stack/components is important
 - To avoid performance and denial-of-service problems